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A Trial Lawyer Reviews Will Bagley’s
Blood of the Prophets
Robert D. Crockett

Introduction

M

any historians have examined the tragic Mountain Meadows
Massacre of 1857, and many yet will.¹ As of the writing of this
review, Will Bagley’s work is one of the latest. Blood of the Prophets has
received eﬀusive praise from reviewers and award committees, a point
prominently noted on the dust jacket.
Bagley’s particular claim to make this book worthwhile is that he
has “troubling new evidence” to prove that President Brigham Young
and Apostle George A. Smith of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints were accessories before the fact to commit the massacre.²

1. Sally Denton, American Massacre: The Tragedy at Mountain Meadows, September
1857 (New York: Knopf, 2003). Glen M. Leonard, Richard E. Turley Jr., and Ronald W.
Walker, Tragedy at Mountain Meadows (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
2. For another book of recent vintage which concludes that Brigham Young directed
the massacre, see William Wise, Massacre at Mountain Meadows: An American Legend
and a Monumental Crime (New York: Crowell, 1976). Although Wise reaches the same
conclusions as Bagley, for a number of reasons Wise’s work is different and of lesser

Review of Will Bagley. Blood of the Prophets: Brigham Young and the
Massacre at Mountain Meadows. Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2002. xxiv + 493 pp., with bibliography and index. $39.95.
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By contrast, in her watershed and erudite works,³ Juanita Brooks
tells us that “no real evidence . . . has been found” to implicate
these authorities before the massacre.⁴ As to matters after the massacre, Bagley follows the path well-worn by others to conclude that
Brigham Young was an accessory after the fact to obstruct justice.
My review examines the way in which the author of Blood of the
Prophets handles these new and old theories. In so doing, I challenge
some of Juanita Brooks’s earlier conclusions. As a trial lawyer, I oﬀer
my perspective of the quality of Bagley’s and Brooks’s evidence and
arguments in some key areas. Trial lawyers may not be trained historians, but we are called upon to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various classes of evidence and to interpret the meaning of
oﬃcial government action. The heinous massacre, its investigation,
the trial of John D. Lee, and the actions of persons who control or
are swept into the legal process (presidents, cabinet members, judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, grand jurors, petit jurors, marshals, and
witnesses) are all matters that lend themselves to a legal analysis. I
am surprised that so little has been done in this area of the massacre’s
legal aftermath.
Speciﬁcally, regarding Blood of the Prophets, it is my view that
Bagley’s analysis of the evidence is uncritical and unbalanced, usually
favoring explanations that would condemn authorities of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Bagley often ignores exculpatory
evidence of a much higher quality than the evidence upon which he
relies to inculpate Brigham Young. Bagley often favors rumor and
speculation over hard evidence, or he relies solely upon rumor and
import than the Bagley eﬀort. Wise relies upon few primary sources and usually rehashes
the polemic of past efforts. See Charles S. Peterson, review of Massacre at Mountain
Meadows, by William Wise, American Historical Review 82/4 (1977): 1072.
3. Juanita Brooks, The Mountain Meadows Massacre (1950; reprint, Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Juanita Brooks, John Doyle Lee: Zealot, Pioneer,
Builder, Scapegoat (1962; reprint with corrections, Logan, Utah: Utah State University
Press, 1992); Juanita Brooks, Emma Lee (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1975; 2nd ed.
with an introduction by Charles S. Peterson, 1984).
4. Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 61.
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speculation when there is no evidence. Although rich in quantity
with primary sources, many of these sources are neither competent
nor credible. Quantity does not equal quality. Bagley sometimes relies upon secondary sources where primary sources are more reliable.
Bagley also has diﬃculty with chronology. At times, he actually
reverses the sequence of events to distort what really happened. This
disregard for the sequence of events causes him to lose the perspective needed to assess the implications of geographic distances and the
passage of time.
Bagley’s work demonstrates a depth (albeit unbalanced) of knowledge of Mormon history. But he lacks the breadth of understanding
of the political and social issues outside the Mormon community that
bear upon the nineteenth-century Mormon question. In particular, he
has not adequately discussed the correspondence between government
oﬃcials about the massacre, its investigation, and its prosecution.
Bagley is too conﬁdent of his evidence, if one can call much of
what he relies on evidence. “Too well, too well thou tell’st a tale so
ill”⁵ could be said of Bagley’s work. Dark, macabre, and depressing,
Bagley’s work is not for the fainthearted who may have little knowledge of the actual events.
Bagley’s Version of the Mountain Meadows Massacre
Let us, then, brieﬂy review Bagley’s dark version of the massacre.
After Mexican territory was annexed to the United States, including
the valley of the Great Salt Lake, Brigham Young sent representatives
to Congress to petition for statehood in the early 1850s. The church
openly announced its practice of plural marriage in 1852. Conﬂicts
with federal judges and other federal appointees, exacerbated by
the rhetoric of the Mormon reformation, led U.S. President James
Buchanan and Congress to conclude that the territory was in a state
of rebellion.
5. Shakespeare, Richard II, 3.2.121.
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To suppress the rebellion, Buchanan sent to Utah the largest domestic army in the history of the antebellum United States. Its advance and
the assassination in Arkansas of Latter-day Saint Apostle Parley P. Pratt
inﬂamed the Mormon residents of the territory against the United States.
Bagley maintains that the church encouraged the Saints to commit acts
of violence against apostates and non-Mormons.
A wagon train of approximately 140 emigrants led by Alexander
Fancher and Captain Jack Baker entered the Salt Lake Valley in 1857
and then proceeded south on their way to California. Bagley’s account has Brigham Young ordering the destruction of the train, sending Apostle George A. Smith to communicate instructions to local
leaders. Bagley informs us that instructions to Paiute Indians to attack the train are evident from Dimick Huntington’s diary.
An advance party of soldiers led by Captain Stewart Van Vliet
met with Young to provision the army. After speaking with Van Vliet,
Young realized that he had overreacted in ordering the destruction.
He sent James Haslam south to countermand those orders.
Indians attacked the party in predawn darkness on Monday, 6 September 1857, after assembling the night before. Armed Mormon militiamen in southern Utah joined the fray on Thursday, 10 September. The
slaughter ended Friday, 11 September, when the emigrants were lured by
a white ﬂag of truce to surrender their weapons. Mormons and Indians
killed them all, except for seventeen or eighteen children. Express rider
Haslam arrived in Cedar City on Sunday, 13 September, with his message from Brigham Young. He was too late.
For the next twenty years church authorities obstructed justice to
shield the perpetrators. Church authorities also conspired to shield
other Mormons who had perpetrated other crimes against nonMormons in the Utah Territory. The Utah Territory was a community dripping in gentile blood which, we are told, was a natural result
of peculiar Mormon doctrines and rituals of violence.
The church struck a deal with U.S. District Attorney Sumner
Howard to oﬀer John D. Lee as a scapegoat. The deal required witnesses to fabricate testimony to convict Lee and required the U.S.
Department of Justice to cease all further prosecutions. John D. Lee
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was the only man brought to justice after trials in 1875 and 1876,
whereupon he was executed in a sensational fashion.
Let us examine some of the more important of Bagley’s conclusions.
Accessory Status versus Acts of War
Even had Bagley correctly deﬁned and understood the meaning of
“accessory before the fact” and “accessory after the fact,” which he and
Brooks and others did not, it is not proper to apply these civil standards
of conduct in wartime conditions. Brigham Young’s tactics on the high
plains against the advancing army were to engage in what would ordinarily be seen as malicious acts of vandalism—burning feedstock,
running oﬀ supply trains, stealing mules, and running oﬀ cattle.⁶ These
acts of malicious vandalism and treason, however, were expressly forgiven by President Buchanan’s war-time pardon for treason, which I
discuss in greater detail below.⁷ The direct authorization of murder is
one thing. Interference during war with feedstock, supply trains, and
army cattle is another thing. These are much more benign acts—all
immunized by Buchanan—than murder. It would be improper to use
these immunized acts as a basis to establish accessory status.
Brigham Young an Accessory before the Fact? The Dimick
Huntington 1857–59 Diary
If one were to accept the faulty proposition that Brigham Young’s
conduct should be judged against civil standards of conduct, and if
Brigham Young desired the destruction of the Fancher train and gave
speciﬁc direction to George A. Smith and Indians to have the deed
done, this would make Young and Smith accessories before the fact.
In nineteenth-century legal parlance this meant “one who, not being
6. Norman F. Furniss, The Mormon Conﬂict 1850–1859 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1960), 142 (stampeded cattle), 143 (theft of mules), 144 (destruction of
supply trains), 160 (whipping up the Indians to ﬁght).
7. James Buchanan, “A Proclamation,” 6 April 1858, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Exec.
Doc. 1, serial 974, pp. 69–72, “oﬀering to the inhabitants of Utah, who shall submit to the
laws, a free pardon for the seditions and treasons heretofore by them committed.”
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present at the commission of the act, does yet procure, counsel, aid
and abet the perpetrator in the commission of it.”⁸
Bagley’s “troubling new evidence,” which separates his work from
Brooks’s, is simply a diary entry, dated 1 September 1857, in which
Indian interpreter Dimick Huntington describes a meeting purportedly held between himself, Brigham Young, and twelve Indian chiefs:
Kanosh the Pahvant Chief[,] Ammon & wife (Walkers
Brother) & 11 Pahvants came into see B & D & find out
about the soldiers. Tutseygubbit a Piede chief over 6 Piedes
Bands Youngwuols another Piede chief & I gave them all
the cattle that had gone to Cal[.] the southa rout[.] it made
them open their eyes[.] they sayed that you have told us not
to steal[.] so I have but now they have come to ﬁght us & you
for when they kill us then they will kill you[.] they sayed
the[y] was afraid to ﬁght the Americans & so would raise
grain & we might ﬁght.⁹ (cf. p. 114)
For Bagley this cryptic entry proves that “the atrocity was not a
tragedy but a premeditated criminal act initiated in Great Salt Lake
City” (p. 378). Blood of the Prophets tells us that “if any court in the
American West (excepting, of course, one of Utah’s probate courts)
had seen the evidence [the Dimick Huntington diary] contained, the
8. Lowenstein v. People, 54 Barb. 299 (N.Y. Sup. 1863). For example, a person who
knowingly rents real property to another for use as a house of prostitution would be guilty
of the oﬀense. Ibid. The mere failure to disclose knowledge that a crime has been committed
does not give rise to a felony. Edmonson v. State, 10 S.W. 21, 22 (Ark. 1888). Thus one who
learns about a house of prostitution from another who confesses to have patronized it is not
guilty of a felony. The felony of accessory before the fact has been subsumed in most states
in the oﬀenses committed by a principal, such as conspiracy or aiding and abetting. See, for
example, State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P.2d 458, 460 (1937) (distinction between a principal crime and an accessory before the fact abolished in Utah in 1935).
9. Dimick B. Huntington, diary, MS 1419 2, Family and Church History Department
Archives, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (hereafter Church Archives),
13–14. Bagley interpolates “allies” where “grain” should be used. I think Bagley’s conclusion is wrong. See Lawrence Coates, review of Blood of the Prophets: Brigham Young and
the Massacre at Mountain Meadows, by Will Bagley, BYU Studies 42/1 (2003): 153.
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only debate among the jurors would have been when, where, and
how high to hang Brigham Young” (p. 425 n. 42).
This scrap of evidence cannot support Bagley’s conclusions, particularly in light of contemporaneous evidence. Brigham Young, if it
was truly he who spoke,¹⁰ did not refer to a speciﬁc emigrant train.
Instead, on that day and on many others, as I will demonstrate, he
asked Indian tribal leaders to help scatter the cattle of the army and
of all emigrants on the trail in front of the army in order to completely close the trail. As historian Norman Furniss observed fifty
years ago, “early in the war at least, the Church’s leaders had a deliberate policy of seeking military assistance from the Indians.”¹¹ When
Brigham Young told the Indian tribes he wanted assistance in ﬁghting the Americans, he meant only the army.¹²
Bagley tells us that the language in Huntington’s diary entry for
1 September 1857 implies an instruction for attack on the Fancher
train. Why then did Dimick Huntington use the same language elsewhere with Indian tribal leaders who could have had no geographic
10. Most historians will probably believe that “B” refers to Brigham Young. I have my
doubts, but it probably makes little diﬀerence to the analysis. Wilford Woodruﬀ veriﬁes that
a meeting occurred that day with Brigham Young, so the “B” may be “Brigham.” However,
nowhere else in the diary is Brigham referred to as “B” (but usually as “Brigham”) and, indeed, “B” appears as someone else earlier in the diary—possibly Ben Simonds, who has
been alternatively described as a Delaware Indian, a half-breed, or a white Indian trader.
Huntington, diary, 1. The diary is reproduced at www.mtn-meadows-assoc.com; search
“Dimick”; select depoJournals/Dimick/Dimick.2.htm (accessed 14 January 2004).
11. Furniss, Mormon Conﬂict, 163.
12. John D. Lee purportedly recounts a conversation he translated for George A.
Smith to the Indians, although Lee is not a good source for translated dialogue; one should
doubt Lee’s ability to complete the translation: “The General told me to tell the Indians
that the Mormons were their friends, and that the Americans were their enemies, and the
enemies of the Mormons, too; that he wanted the Indians to remain the fast friends of
the Mormons, for the Mormons were all friends to the Indians; that the Americans had
a large army just east of the mountains, and intended to come over the mountains into
Utah and kill all of the Mormons and Indians in Utah Territory.” William W. Bishop, ed.,
Mormonism Unveiled: or the Life and Confessions of the Late Mormon Bishop, John D. Lee
(St. Louis: Bryan, Brand, 1877; reprint, Salt Lake City: Utah Lighthouse Ministry, n.d.),
223. Although I have doubts about this encounter, it shows that Mormon leaders, when
they referred to the Americans, referred to the advancing armies and not emigrants.
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proximity to the Fancher train? For instance, two days earlier in
Huntington’s diary, 30 August 1857, Huntington wrote:
I [Huntington] told them that the Lord had come out of his
Hiding place & they had to commence their work[.] I gave them
all the Beef cattle & horses that was on the Road to CalAfornia[,]
the North Rout[,] that they must put them into the mountains &
not kill any thing as Long as they can help it but when they do
Kill[,] take the old ones & not kill the cows or young ones.¹³
When Huntington talks about not killing anything “as Long as they
can help it” he is talking about “cows.” He asked the northern Indians for
help to run cattle oﬀ the northern California route upon which the Fancher
train would never tread. Following the massacre, Indian agent Garland
Hurt, certainly no friend of the Mormons, noted the same requests were
made to the northern Snake Indians.¹⁴ T. B. H. Stenhouse also conﬁrms
that running the cattle oﬀ was a general strategy used successfully against
the army.¹⁵ Thus, Brigham Young’s 1 September 1857 comment: “I gave
them all the cattle” can only mean one thing. He oﬀered the Indians all the
cattle they could scatter that were owned by the army.
13. Huntington, diary, 11–12.
14. Indian Superintendent Garland Hurt determined for himself after the massacre
that Brigham Young sought Indian help to run cattle oﬀ. Northern Indian tribes told him
that “Dimie B. Huntington (interpreter for Brigham Young) and Bishop West, of Ogden,
came to the Snake village, and told the Indians that Brigham wanted them to run oﬀ the
emigrants’ cattle, and if they would do so they might have them as their own.” Hurt continues: “I have frequently been told by the chiefs of the Utahs that Brigham Young was
trying to bribe them to join in rebellion against the United States . . . on conditions that
they would assist him in opposing the advance of the United States troops.” Garland Hurt
to Jacob Forney, 4 December 1857, 35th Cong., 1st sess., H. Exec. Doc. 71, serial 956,
p. 204. Huntington’s diary account of the event and Hurt’s thirdhand account conﬂict.
Huntington’s diary does not include a speciﬁc request to run oﬀ the cattle of emigrants,
but appears to be limited to a request to run oﬀ the army’s cattle. Hurt’s thirdhand account
of Huntington’s statement, which Hurt reported after the massacre became public knowledge, includes a request to run oﬀ the army’s cattle. Given Hurt’s well-acknowledged hostility to Brigham Young, I would view Hurt’s statement about emigrants’ cattle as a probable exaggeration. But, it is not unreasonable to think that Huntington’s vocalized strategy
to the Indians was to obstruct overland traﬃc by running everyone’s cattle oﬀ.
15. T. B. H. Stenhouse, The Rocky Mountain Saints (New York: Appleton, 1873), 378.
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Let us look at who was present at that 1 September 1857 meeting
because this bears on Bagley’s theory about instructions to destroy
the Fancher train. Most of the Indians present led tribes that had
no geographic proximity to the Fancher train, as massacre historian
and attorney Robert Briggs has pointed out.¹⁶ Only two or three of
the twelve chieftains present might have had some connection to the
tribes that participated in the massacre. Tutsegabit and Youngwuds
were the two Southern Paiute chiefs present in Brigham Young’s ofﬁce whose tribes resided in Iron County (p. 113).
Not only were the wrong people in the 1 September 1857 meeting, the participants were probably talking about a geographic area
far from the location of the Fancher train. I have substantial doubt
that Brigham Young’s reference to the “south rout[e]” on 1 September
meant anything more than the entire route south of present-day
Wyoming upon which the army was advancing. With contemporaneous descriptions of the south route referring to the entire road
south of Lander Pass in Wyoming, it is unreasonable to conclude that
Brigham Young had some other meaning for “south rout[e].”¹⁷
16. Robert H. Briggs, “Wrestling Brigham,” review of Blood of the Prophets: Brigham
Young and the Massacre at Mountain Meadows, by Will Bagley, Sunstone, December 2002,
63. Wilford Woodruﬀ, who met the Indian chiefs but was not invited to the hour-long
meeting with them, noted in his journal on that date that twelve Indian chiefs from various tribes were in attendance. Scott G. Kenney, ed., Wilford Woodruﬀ ’s Journal: 1833–
1898 Typescript (Midvale, Utah: Signature Books, 1984), 5:88.
17. For a discussion of the Fancher train’s progress, see Donald R. Moorman with
Gene A. Sessions, Camp Floyd and the Mormons: The Utah War (Salt Lake City: University
of Utah Press, 1992), 128: “Traveling in two sections, the train weathered the journey
across the plains and gave every indication that it intended to pursue the snow-free southern route to California.” Federal surveyor Lander described the “southern route” in F. W.
Lander to W. M. F. Magraw, 1859, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Exec. Doc. 108, serial 1008,
pp. 63–65. A federal surveyor described the southern route as the route from “St. Louis
to Salt Lake City, as above; thence by way of Vegas de Santa Clara and Los Angeles.” J. H.
Simpson to Oﬃce of Topographical Engineers, Department of Utah, 22 February 1859,
35th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Exec. Doc. 40, serial 984, p. 37. Describing Simpson’s report, one
historian writes about the “northern route along the Oregon Trail” and all other roads to
the south. W. Turrentine Jackson, Wagon Roads West: A Study of Federal Road Surveys
and Construction in the Trans-Mississippi West 1846–1869 (1952; reprint, with foreword
by William H. Goetzmann, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), 29.
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Further, Bagley’s chronology is problematic to the point of impossibility. Tutsegabit and Youngwuds did not have time to get from
Salt Lake City to Mountain Meadows and return to Salt Lake City by
16 September 1857 or, as Huntington says, by 10 September 1857.¹⁸
Blood of the Prophets tells us these Indian chiefs were surprised when
they were purportedly told to massacre the Fancher train on 1 September but that they recovered from this surprise, and within ﬁve
days (without horses, no less)¹⁹ traveled three hundred miles to organize and lead the ﬁrst wave of assaults, assembling for the assault on
the evening of 5 September for a predawn attack the next morning.
In contrast, John D. Lee claims he rushed on horseback to Salt Lake
City to make a report to Brigham Young of the massacre, saying that
“I was on the way about ten days,” and Lee did not get started for
ten days.²⁰ With excellent and replenished horseﬂesh, it took James
Haslam three days to travel the same distance with Isaac Haight’s request for instructions. Wilford Woodruﬀ records Tutsegabit’s presence to be ordained an elder in Salt Lake City, certainly not an emergency, ﬁve days after the massacre concluded or, as the Huntington
diary says, in the middle of the massacre.²¹ It is implausible to think
that Tutsegabit and Youngwuds made this round-trip in such a short
period of time. Moreover, neither Tutsegabit nor Youngwuds were reported to be at the massacre.
Thus, I disagree with Bagley’s eﬀort to render what is simple and
relatively benign (general cattle running) to what is complex and malicious (killing emigrants). The developed law of evidence cautions
18. Huntington, diary, 14. See also discussion of this date in Coates, review of Blood
of the Prophets.
19. As explained at the end of this review, the Paiutes were the poorest of the poor
among Indians. Regarding the Paiutes and horses, as one article in the Salt Lake Tribune
notes: “The Utes, who exchanged the Indian slaves they captured for horses, were known
for their business acumen. But not the Paiutes. ‘The Paiutes just ate them.’ ” Mark Havnes,
“Spanish Trail Given National Designation,” Salt Lake Tribune, 24 March 2003, sec. D.
20. Bishop, Mormonism Unveiled, 252.
21. Robert K. Fielding, ed., The Tribune Reports of the Trials of John D. Lee for the
Massacre at Mountain Meadows (Higganum, Conn.: Kent Books, 2000), 297; Kenney,
Wilford Woodruﬀ ’s Journal, 5:98; Huntington, diary, 14.
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against reaching conclusions about wrongful conduct from a set of
facts that could explain more benign actions.²² As Robert Briggs asks
in his Sunstone essay, with twenty-ﬁve hundred troops approaching,
why would Brigham Young concern himself with forty armed men in
the Arkansas train?²³
Brigham Young an Accessory before the Fact? Captain Van Vliet’s
Meeting with Brigham Young
Isaac Haight, a stake president in Cedar City, dispatched James
Haslam to Brigham Young for instructions about the Fancher train.
It is not contested that Brigham Young received Haight’s message and
sent Haslam back to tell Haight not to meddle with the Fancher train
and to “spare no horseﬂesh” about it. As Haslam describes it, when he
arrived in Salt Lake City, he found President Young in council with
several others. Young read the message from Haight and told Haslam
to rest and return to Brigham Young’s oﬃce at 1:00 p.m. “He asked
if I could stand the trip back; he said the Indians must be kept from
the emigrants at all cost, if it took all of Iron County to protect them.”
When Haslam returned to Young’s office at the appointed time,
President Young “told me to start and not to spare horseﬂesh, but to
go down there just as quick as possible.” When Haight received the
message, Haight said: “Too late, too late.” Haight “cried like a child.”²⁴
Haslam was never impeached as to his story, and it remained consistent throughout his lifetime.²⁵
Bagley must determine how to handle this exculpatory evidence.
As Brooks concludes, the Haslam ride demonstrated Brigham Young’s
22. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richﬁeld Co., 25 Cal. 4th 826, 852, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2nd 841, 863 (2001).
23. Briggs, “Wrestling Brigham,” 65.
24. “Testimony of James Holt Haslam: Taken at Wellsville, Cache County, Utah,
December 4, 1884,” supplement to Charles W. Penrose, The Mountain Meadows Massacre:
Who Were Guilty of the Crime? (Salt Lake City: Juvenile Instructor Oﬃce, 1884), in L. Tom
Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
25. John A Widtsoe recounted his boyhood encounter with Haslam in his diary, as
republished in Alan K. Parrish, John A. Widtsoe: A Biography (Salt Lake City: Deseret
Book, 2003), 46–47.
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lack of complicity in plotting the massacre.²⁶ Bagley turns exculpatory
evidence into inculpatory evidence. He tells us that Young, in a change
of heart, used Haslam to attempt to countermand previous orders of
destruction. Blood of the Prophets says that “after learning from [advance Army Captain] Stewart Van Vliet that the government’s intentions were not as demonic as he had feared, Young sent orders south
with James Haslam to stop the events he had set in motion” (p. 379).
No evidence supports Bagley’s complex theory about countermanded instructions. When Bagley talks about Young’s encounter with
Van Vliet, he avoids saying much about dates, a strange thing given the
crucial importance he attaches to this story. The sequence of events tells
us that it is unlikely Young accumulated enough information to countermand his purported orders of destruction. On Tuesday, 8 September
1857, in the evening, Van Vliet arrived in Salt Lake Valley to secure
provisions for the army (pp. 134–35). The next day, on Wednesday,
Young met with church leaders and one hundred citizens met with Van
Vliet to discuss the army’s needs for provisions.²⁷ The next morning,
Thursday, 10 September, Haslam arrived and departed in the afternoon with Brigham Young’s message to Haight.²⁸ There is no evidence,
as of this time, that any communication of substance passed between
Brigham Young and Van Vliet on the ﬁrst night.²⁹ As to the Wednesday
meeting involving the hundred citizens, the evidence shows only bellicosity on the part of Young, who told Van Vliet that the Saints would
not provide supplies to the army, and that the army should expect a
ﬂogging.³⁰ In other words, no evidence of any sort shows rapproche26. Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 142.
27. Kenney, Wilford Woodruff ’s Journal, 5:91; Orson F. Whitney, History of Utah:
Comprising Preliminary Chapters on the Previous History of Her Founders, Accounts of
Early Spanish and American Explorations in the Rocky Mountain Region, the Advent of the
Mormon Pioneers, The Establishment and Dissolution of the Provisional Government of the
State of Deseret, and the Subsequent Creation and Development of the Territory (Salt Lake
City: Cannon & Sons, 1892), 1:616.
28. “Testimony of James Holt Haslam.”
29. Kenney, Wilford Woodruﬀ ’s Journal, 5:91; Everett L. Cooley, ed., Diary of Brigham
Young 1857 (Salt Lake City: Tanner Trust Fund, University of Utah Library, 1980), 76–78.
30. Cooley, Diary of Brigham Young, 78–79.
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ment before Haslam left. It is pure supposition to say that Young and
Van Vliet said anything in the short time period above to cause Young
to change his mind about the army. Bagley has pointed to no journal
entry to prove his supposition.
After Haslam left, it is quite apparent that Young continued his
policy of obstruction. On Sunday, 13 September, Young, with Van
Vliet sharing the stand in the Bowery, threatened the army: “If [the
Lord] will turn our enemies away, praised be his name. But if it
should become a duty to take the sword, let us do it manfully and in
the strength of Israel’s God. Then one will chase a thousand, and two,
will put ten thousand to ﬂight.”³¹
Van Vliet left Salt Lake City at three in the morning on Monday,
14 September,³² disheartened over Young’s obduracy, as he later reported to his superiors.³³ One day after Van Vliet’s departure on 15 September 1857, Brigham Young issued a declaration of martial law:³⁴
31. Brigham Young, in Journal of Discourses, 5:229 (13 September 1857).
32. Kenney, Wilford Woodruﬀ ’s Journal, 5:92–96.
33. Whitney, History of Utah, 1:615–16.
34. Many, including Richard Poll, believe the declaration of martial law was first
issued 5 August 1857. Fielding, Tribune Reports, 296; Richard D. Poll, “The Utah
Expedition,” in Encyclopedia of Mormonism, 4:1501 (photocopy of declaration). If that
is true, the 15 September 1857 republication would not ﬁt at all in Bagley’s theory that
the declaration was created to facilitate the massacre (p. 192) because the declaration was
published weeks before. Bagley does not appear to mention the 5 August order; the two
are identical. For now, I lack evidence that the 5 August order was ever published except
for the copy of it in Poll’s article in the Encyclopedia of Mormonism. Bagley may be right
that the ﬁrst publication was in September, but he does not address the consensus alternate view, which oﬀers a dramatically diﬀerent and more benign explanation. The timing
of the issuance of that order has led to substantial confusion, partially because of errors in
the original indictment—an error upon which Lee’s attorneys attempted to capitalize at
trial. See Whitney’s observation of the rather common timing error in Whitney, History
of Utah, 2:816–17. Bancroft erred over the timing of the martial law order and the commencement of the attack, but he concluded nonetheless that Brigham Young had nothing
to do with the attack. Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Utah 1540–1886 (San Francisco:
History, 1889), 560. Another work that stumbles over the date of the event is the very
entertaining Ann Eliza Young, Wife No. 19, or the Story of a Life in Bondage, Being a
Complete Exposé of Mormonism, and Revealing the Sorrows, Sacriﬁces and Suﬀerings of
Women in Polygamy (Hartford, Conn.: Dustin, Gilman, 1875), 237–49.
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We are condemned unheard, and forced to an issue with an
armed mercenary mob, which has been sent against us at the
instigation of anonymous letter writers, ashamed to father
the base, slanderous falsehoods which they have given to the
public; of corrupt oﬃcials, who have brought false accusations against us to screen themselves in their own infamy;
and of hireling priests and howling editors, who prostitute
the truth for ﬁlthy lucre’s sake.³⁵
Brigham Young indeed had a change of heart about the advancing
army. It came after months of analysis, as Norman Furniss concludes.³⁶ Haslam’s ride cannot be explained as an attempt to countermand prior orders, and Bagley’s theory is ﬁctional.
Apostle George A. Smith an Accessory before the Fact?
Blood of the Prophets says that “even before the Fancher party
left Salt Lake, George A. Smith was on his way to southern Utah
to arrange their destruction at a remote and lonely spot” (p. 381).
This argument assumes Brigham Young had formulated the plan
for destruction when the Fancher train was still in Salt Lake City
on 5 August 1857. There is no evidence of material provocation by
the Fancher train at this early stage except from persons with no
reliable basis upon which to provide testimony. Bagley relies on
Argus’s thirdhand account that Eleanor Pratt spotted a conspirator to the death of Parley P. Pratt among the train members in Salt
Lake City (p. 98) without giving attribution.³⁷ The anonymous author who used the pseudonym of Argus and published a series of
letters in the Corinne (Utah) Reporter lacks indicia of reliability
for most of his observations. Bagley believes that Argus was later
35. Whitney, History of Utah, 1:615–17; Comprehensive History of the Church, 4:272–73.
36. Furniss, Mormon Conﬂict, 124–26.
37. “Mrs. McLean Pratt is said to have recognized one or more of the emigrants as
being present at the murder of the apostle.” “Extracts from ‘Open Letters from “Argus” to
Brigham Young,’ ” in Stenhouse, Rocky Mountain Saints, 431.
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determined to be one Charles Wandell. Wandell, who lived in
California at the time of the massacre, had nothing to do with it
(p. 434 n. 50).³⁸ When Blood of the Prophets relies upon Argus, it
relies upon a purveyor of thirdhand uncorroborated speculation.
Bagley claims that instructions “from headquarters” to kill those
in the train went from George A. Smith to Isaac Haight (p. 298).
Again this source is Argus. Bagley claims that unnamed “federal
investigators suspected that in August 1857 Smith carried Young’s
orders to massacre the Fancher train to southern Utah” (p. 297, emphasis added). This is not, however, evidence. If federal investigators had any evidence to support their suspicions, they would have
aired it in the ﬁrst Lee trial when, as we will see in the discussion
below, they had every incentive to do so.
Nobody has ever oﬀered any believable evidence that George A.
Smith gave instructions to Haight and Lee to massacre the train. John
D. Lee is the only person who purported to oﬀer evidence of these instructions. I do not see how Bagley can place any faith in Lee’s confessions, particularly those written as Mormonism Unveiled. Lee wrote this
confession with the assistance of William Bishop, his attorney. Bishop
relied on these confessions to obtain his fee. As Bishop urged Lee to
ﬁnish his work before his execution, he told Lee that he would be “adding such facts . . . as will make the Book interesting and useful to the
public.” The matters of greatest interest to Bishop were those things
that would implicate Brigham Young and church authorities, things
which Bishop thought would make the book sell.³⁹ In any event, Lee’s
claim that George A. Smith met Lee in southern Utah on 1 September
38. Charles Wandell was appointed a captain of ﬁfty-two by church oﬃcials in the evacuation of the San Bernardino church members. He came through Mountain Meadows a few
months after the massacre. He settled in Beaver. According to Bagley, in 1871, shortly after his
excommunication from the church, Wandell began publishing his pseudonymic “Argus” letters
about the massacre in the Corinne (Utah) Reporter. He joined the Reorganized Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints in 1873. His extensive ﬁles on the massacre were destroyed by a
ﬁre at the Herald Publishing House in 1907. Marjorie Newton, Hero or Traitor: A Biographical
Study of Charles Wesley Wandell (Independence, Mo.: Herald, 1992).
39. William Bishop to John D. Lee, 23 February 1877, Papers of Jacob Smith Boreman, 1857–1912, Huntington Library.
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1857 (an approximate date deduced from Lee’s text) with orders of destruction⁴⁰ was impossible because Smith was hundreds of miles away
in Salt Lake City on that very day, as well as the day before.⁴¹
Accessory after the Fact: The Claim That Brigham Young
Conspired to Dispose of the Fancher Train’s Property
Blood of the Prophets and other works⁴² theorize that church oﬃcials conspired as “accessories after the fact” to obstruct justice. To be
an accessory after the fact, a person must have an active and immediate role in concealing a crime, such as providing the means for an
escape or shutting the door against law enforcement oﬃcers. Dealing
in stolen goods also conveys accessory-after-the-fact status. Passivity,
however, does not.⁴³
Bagley does not state clearly what facts confer accessory-after-the
fact status upon Young. Certainly, we should reject both Brooks’s and
Bagley’s attempts to redeﬁne the crime as passivity in that they both
tell us that Brigham Young was an accessory after the fact merely because “he knew what had happened, and how and why it happened”
(p. 377). This may be a historian’s standard of complicity, but it is not
a legal standard. By Brooks’s and Bagley’s standard, newspaper reporters would qualify for accessory status.
40. Bishop, Mormonism Unveiled, 221, 223–24.
41. Kenney, Wilford Woodruﬀ ’s Journal, 5:88. Orson F. Whitney says: “The fact that
he had never heard of the Arkansas emigrants before he met them at Corn Creek, where
he camped near them one night on his way back to Salt Lake City, and that he immediately started east and heard no more of them until he reached Bridger, appears to have
escaped the notice of those who subsequently sought to associate him with the tragedy at
Mountain Meadows.” Whitney, History of Utah, 1:697.
42. Bishop, Mormonism Unveiled, 381; John H. Beadle, Western Wilds, and the Men Who
Redeem Them (Cincinnati: Jones Brothers, 1879), 527–28; Furniss, Mormon Conﬂict, 88.
43. Wren v. Com., 26 Gratt. 952, 67 Va. 952 (Va. 1875). Moreover, a cleric who receives information about a crime from a penitent cannot become an accessory because
the information is privileged. Francis Wharton, A Treatise on Criminal Law, 9th ed.
(Philadelphia: Kay and Brother, 1884), 443–45. Although there is no direct evidence that
Lee gave Brigham Young a penitential confession, any confession would have been privileged and completely protected from any disclosure. Church attorneys may have justiﬁably told Brigham Young that anything Lee told him about the massacre was a privileged
confession and could not be relied on for any purpose except church discipline.
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In my attempt to separate the wheat from the chaﬀ of Blood of the
Prophets’s evidence, I agree with Bagley that a conspiracy to receive
the emigrants’ property would be evidence suﬃcient to brand somebody an accessory after the fact. Is there competent evidence to show
that Brigham Young conspired to receive the emigrant’s property?
Bagley appears to rely upon two events in which Young purportedly gave instructions for the disposition of Fancher train property.
For one event, the evidence turns on the statement of one man, Philip
Klingensmith. Blood of the Prophets tells us that at the church’s general conference on 6 October 1857, Klingensmith said that Lee made
a full report of the massacre to Young and then was told to “dispose
of that property” and “say nothing about it” (p. 178).
Brigham Young denied this meeting and speciﬁcally denied any
statement about the property.⁴⁴ Although Bagley spends some time
discounting Young’s aﬃdavit of denial, his argument is less than convincing. Let’s assume, however, that Brigham Young’s aﬃdavit does
not exist. How good is Klingensmith’s testimony? Klingensmith’s
statement was not corroborated when it should have been. The version of Lee’s confession, published by William Bishop, discussed the
meeting with Brigham Young but mentions neither Klingensmith
nor Young’s directions about disposition of the property.⁴⁵ Lee was in
a position to corroborate Klingensmith but did not.
Additionally, upon cross-examination during the ﬁrst Lee trial,
Klingensmith admitted that whatever passed between Lee and Young
about the massacre was outside his hearing.⁴⁶ His testimony was so
worthless that U.S. District Attorney Sumner Howard declined to recall Klingensmith for the second trial.
Klingensmith also admitted to participating in the massacre. He
turned state’s evidence before Lee’s ﬁrst trial in exchange for a grant of
44. Brigham Young, aﬃdavit, 30 July 1875, in Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 286.
45. Bishop, Mormonism Unveiled, 251–53.
46. Trial Transcript, People of the Territory of Utah v. John D. Lee (1875), Utah State
Historical Society, MS B 915 (Charles Peterson copy), 27, 93. Klingensmith did purport to
hear Brigham Young give directions about keeping something a secret.
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immunity. He gave his testimony as a disillusioned apostate.⁴⁷ Thus his
6 October 1857 account is very suspect, even without Young’s denial.
The second event Bagley marshals as evidence of Young’s participation in the property disposition is, again, in the Huntington diary.
Bagley argues that after Chief Arapeen told him about the massacre, Young advised Arapeen to help himself to the booty (p. 170).
Bagley, however, changes the actual sequence of events to make
things appear as they are not. The Huntington diary shows that
Young ﬁrst asked Arapeen—just as Brigham Young had asked all
other Indian chieftains—to help himself to the army’s cattle. Then
Arapeen tells him about “a” massacre.⁴⁸ Nobody thereafter suggested to Arapeen that he help himself to the Fancher train booty.
Brigham Young would never have done this because Arapeen’s tribe
was too far north in Utah. Bagley’s explanation is akin to asking the
mayor of Ogden to help himself to the coﬀers of Cedar City.
I see no evidence to support the level of complicity necessary to
establish that Brigham Young was an accessory after the fact through
his giving instructions to dispose of the Fancher train booty.
Accessory after the Fact: Obstruction of Justice and the Failure to
Analyze the Eﬀect of the Presidential Amnesty
Blood of the Prophets has charged high-ranking church oﬃcials
with two decades of obstructing the federal investigation. Bagley’s
47. Klingensmith was excommunicated from the church in 1871 but said he left the
church on his own accord in 1868 or 1869. Trial Transcript (1875), 96.
48. Huntington, diary, 18–19. Brigham Young tells Arapeen “to help himself to what
he wanted,” but Arapeen demurs, saying that he had no ﬁght with “the Americans.” Then,
as the conversation progresses, “he told me that the Piedes [Southern Paiutes] had killd
the whole of a Emigrant company & took all of their stock & it was right[.] that was
before the news had reached the City.” I don’t think Huntington made this diary entry
contemporaneously with events, otherwise why would he say that Arapeen knew of the
massacre “before the news had reached the City”? This entry causes me to suspect that
the Huntington diary entry was written after the fact (and thus mixing up events with a
rumored story, later shown to be false, of another, earlier massacre), but the entry refutes
Blood of the Prophets’s claim that Arapeen ﬁrst told Brigham Young about the massacre
and then received instructions to take the plunder. Ibid.
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emphasis is in Mormon history, so he sometimes shows his lack
of breadth in political and social matters that originate outside the
Great Basin. One of the areas in which he displays this weakness is
his failure to discuss the eﬀect of President Buchanan’s general amnesty upon the massacre prosecutions (p. 205).
Buchanan issued an amnesty for all crimes of the Mormons related to the claimed acts of sedition and treason. Governor Alfred
Cumming announced a broad interpretation of that amnesty to the
Saints on 14 June 1858.⁴⁹ Certainly, by the date of the amnesty, federal oﬃcials believed that Mormons had directed the massacre, and
they believed that John D. Lee was one of the leaders.⁵⁰ One might
reasonably conclude that the amnesty was intended to cover the massacre participants.
Some in the federal government and the press believed that
Buchanan intended to pardon the massacre perpetrators. Indian superintendent Jacob Forney was so upset with U.S. District Court Judge
John Cradlebaugh’s massacre investigation that he cursed Cradlebaugh’s
name, citing the amnesty as the basis for his objections, or so we are told
from a source hostile to Forney.⁵¹ Non-Mormon U.S. District Attorney
Alexander Wilson and non-Mormon U.S. District Court Judge Charles C.
Sinclair disagreed over the application of the amnesty, with Wilson
49. James Buchanan, “A Proclamation,” 6 April 1858, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Exec.
Doc. 1, serial 974, pp. 69–72, “oﬀering to the inhabitants of Utah, who shall submit to
the laws, a free pardon for the seditions and treasons heretofore by them committed.”
This is not exactly an amnesty for all crimes relating to the invasion. Governor Cumming
expanded upon this to include “all criminal oﬀenses associated with or growing out of
the overt acts of sedition and treason are merged in them.” Otis G. Hammond, The Utah
Expedition: 1857–1858: Letters of Capt. Jesse A. Gove, 10th Inf., U.S.A., of Concord, N.H.,
to Mrs. Gove, and Special Correspondence of the New York Herald (Concord, N.H.: New
Hampshire Historical Society, 1928), 356–57.
50. Hurt to Forney, serial 956, p. 203.
51. Forney told others that Mormons “were all included in the President’s proclamation and pardon, and would not be tried or punished for any oﬀense whatever committed
prior to the issuing of the pardon; that Judge Cradlebaugh was not a ﬁt man for oﬃce,”
apparently accompanying his comments about the judge with “unmeasured terms, no
language being too low or ﬁlthy.” James Lynch, aﬃdavit before D. R. Eckles [Chief Justice
of Utah Supreme Court], 27 July 1859, 36th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 42, serial 1033, p. 84.
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Judge John Cradlebaugh (1819–72, with service in Utah from 1858 to 1860). Courtesy
Utah State Historical Society.

refusing to present to the jury bills of indictment.⁵² Harper’s Weekly
noted the conﬂict over the amnesty in the prosecution of the massacre.⁵³
The New York Post opined that the amnesty excused the massacre crimes
because it was an aspect of the Utah war intended to come within the
amnesty’s scope.⁵⁴ It is no wonder that prosecution was uncertain. But,
52. Stenhouse, Rocky Mountain Saints, 402–3.
53. “The Mountain Meadows Massacre,” Harper’s Weekly: Journal of Civilization, 14
August 1875, 661–66 at 666.
54. New York Post, cited in Beadle, Western Wilds, 514. Beadle was a journalist for
the Union Vedette and the Salt Lake Daily Tribune, as well as a lawyer and a judicial clerk.
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given the controversy the amnesty sparked in the Eastern press with regard to the massacre investigation, it seems that Blood of the Prophets
would have discussed it. This is a signiﬁcant omission.
Accessory after the Fact: Obstruction of Justice and the Dispute
between the Two Branches of Federal Government
The presidential amnesty contributed to the lengthy delay in federal prosecution. In addition, the federal judiciary and federal prosecutor fought over control of the massacre investigation. This internecine dispute stymied federal investigation of the massacre for several
years. Bagley does not discuss this feud as a source for delay.
At the national level in the early nineteenth century, the federal judiciary and the prosecutors repeatedly jockeyed for power in ways that
would appear unseemly today. Thomas Jeﬀerson said that the “great object of my fear is the federal judiciary. That body, like gravity, ever acting with noiseless foot & unalarming advance, [is] gaining ground step
by step. . . . Let the eye of vigilance never be closed.” He condemned
the judiciary’s usurpation of the legislative prerogatives with its pious
interpretation of its own brand of Christianity.⁵⁵ The U.S. Constitution
gives little direction to the judiciary compared to what it gives to the
legislative and executive branches. The Hamiltonian Federalists saw the
federal judiciary as a way to expand federal power and to crush state
self-determinism (read: slavery). The Jeﬀersonian republicans believed
states’ rights were paramount except as to powers speciﬁcally delegated
to the federal government. The Federalist judiciary gained the upper
hand with the enforcement of the Sedition Act of 4 July 1798, which
Beadle’s best-known work was Brigham’s Destroying Angel: Being the Life, Confession, and
Startling Disclosures of the Notorious Bill Hickman, the Danite Chief of Utah: Written by
Himself, with Explanatory Notes by J. H. Beadle (Salt Lake City: Shepard Book, 1904).
55. James F. Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jeﬀerson, John Marshall, and the
Epic Struggle to Create a United States (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), epigraph following dedication page; Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and
Constitutional Conﬂict in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2002), 57.
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crushed Jeﬀersonian dissent. As historian James Simon explains, their
“blatantly partisan actions [of stifling criticism of the John Adams
administration] in pursuit of convictions under the Sedition Act
reinforced Jefferson’s profound distrust of the federal judiciary.”⁵⁶
Supreme Court Justice Salmon Chase’s prosecutions under the Sedition
Act, while a sitting Supreme Court justice, were notorious, eventually
leading to an attempt to remove him by impeachment.⁵⁷
Utah’s federal judges replayed this high national drama on
a frontier stage. As with the amnesty, Blood of the Prophets fails to
see the broad political and social issues of the struggle for federal
power. Brigham Young’s demand for local self-determinism replaced
Thomas Jeﬀerson’s urbane urge for state self-determinism. Polygamy,
rather than slavery, was an aﬀront to federal power and needed to be
crushed.⁵⁸ In the early days of Utah, federal judges of questionable
character—a point Van Vliet conceded⁵⁹—directed the investigation
of crime, requested army troops to march against the local citizenry,
harangued citizens in their places of worship about the lack of virtue in their plural wives, and testiﬁed in Congress about Mormon
debauchery. These judicial eﬀorts to crush the Mormon theocracy
would be unthinkable today in any social context.
Blood of the Prophets accepts Cradlebaugh’s account of the dispute
uncritically, condemning the U.S. district attorney as “pliant” (p. 235)
and “ ‘closely allied to the Mormons by some mysterious tie’ ” (p. 217)
for failing to do anything about the massacre. Citing Cradlebaugh and
Sinclair, we are told that Wilson’s “whole course of conduct has been
marked with culpable timidity and neglect.”⁶⁰ Bagley would have us
believe that the U.S. district attorney was too cozy with the Mormons
and that the Mormons lobbied him to ignore the massacre.
56. Simon, What Kind of Nation, 53.
57. Ibid., 112–16.
58. Pennsylvania law professor Sarah Barringer Gordon also sees the assault upon polygamy as an extension of the assault upon southern states’ rights. Gordon, The Mormon
Question, 57.
59. Kenney, Wilford Woodruﬀ ’s Journal, 5:93.
60. John Cradlebaugh and Charles E. Sinclair to James Buchanan, 16 July 1859, 36th
Cong., 1st sess., S. Exec. Doc. 32, serial 1031, p. 19.
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The official correspondence, however, shows that the executive and judicial branches of government distrusted each other and
that neither was effective in the prosecution of the massacre. The
purported investigation began, at least in Cradlebaugh’s view, with
grand jury proceedings from 8 to 21 March 1859 in Provo. Mormon
accounts say Cradlebaugh called out the army to terrorize the local
Provo population with the might of federal power. Cradlebaugh and
Bagley assert that the troops were necessary to protect the court and
witnesses from Mormon Danite assassins. Governor Cumming sided
with the Mormons, who were outraged with Cradlebaugh’s use of the
troops. Cumming believed that he, as the federal executive, had the
sole civilian authority to call out the troops in the Territory.
Attorney General Black in Washington, D.C., said that it was not
Cradlebaugh’s job to determine whom to prosecute or when to call
out the troops. He instructed U.S. District Attorney Wilson to “oppose every eﬀort which any judge may make to usurp your functions.
. . . If the judges will conﬁne themselves to the simple and plain duty
imposed upon them by law of hearing and deciding the cases that are
brought before them, I am sure that the business of the Territory will
get along very well.”⁶¹
President Buchanan approved of Wilson’s eﬀorts to resist the judiciary’s incursion into his prerogatives and the use of federal troops.⁶²
General Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding Camp Floyd, implied that
he was unhappy being called into the fray to support the judiciary.⁶³
Black attempted to rein in the Utah judges, explaining to them
the judiciary’s function to “hear patiently the causes brought before
them.”⁶⁴ The executive branch has a “public accuser, and a marshal.”
As the U.S. Supreme Court said in an 1868 landmark case, public
prosecutions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. district
61. Black to Wilson, 17 May 1859, serial 1031, p. 9.
62. Ibid., 10.
63. A[lbert] S[idney] Johnston to Lieutenant Colonel L. Thomas, 27 April 1859, 36th
Cong., 1st sess., S. Exec. Doc. 42, serial 1033, pp. 4–5.
64. [U.S. Attorney General] J. S. Black to John Cradlebaugh and Charles E. Sinclair,
17 May 1859, 36th Cong., 1st sess., S. Exec. Doc. 32, serial 1031, p. 2.
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attorney until indicted oﬀenses are in trial before a petit jury. Judges
have no role in prosecutions until then.⁶⁵
Addressing a defensive letter to President Buchanan, Cradlebaugh
and fellow judge Charles Sinclair admitted that “the diﬃculty [which
has] arisen between the judiciary and executive is deeply to be deplored.”⁶⁶ Nonetheless, the judges attacked Governor Cumming and
U.S. District Attorney Wilson for failing to faithfully execute their
duties, especially in connection with the 1859 Provo grand jury.⁶⁷
Cradlebaugh’s grasping for prosecutorial power made prosecution
nigh impossible. Prosecutors must work with judges to obtain warrants
and convene grand juries, but Cradlebaugh would not cooperate. He complained to Buchanan that Wilson refused to execute (i.e., serve) bench warrants for witnesses, but Wilson countered that Cradlebaugh would not give
him the warrants for execution.⁶⁸ Wilson wanted the massacre grand jury
to be empanelled in southern Utah, close to the scene. He also urged the
Justice Department to provide funds “to enable the oﬃcers of the court to
make a patient and thorough search for evidence.”⁶⁹ Cradlebaugh (remember, he is the judge, not the prosecutor) responded to Wilson’s request by
traveling to Santa Clara and issuing arrest warrants in 1859. None of them
were executed. Why not? Cradlebaugh failed to include in his entourage
the person with prosecutorial discretion, the U.S. district attorney. He further refused to respond to Wilson’s request for information about the warrants so that they could be served. Cradlebaugh also refused to tell Wilson
about his activities in Santa Clara.⁷⁰ Blood of the Prophets does not explain
how the prosecutor could be expected to prosecute when the judge shuts
him out of the process.
The signiﬁcance of this episode is unmistakable. The prosecution
delayed as it resisted the judiciary’s grasping for control of the massacre investigation. This material escapes Bagley.
65. Conﬁscation Cases, 74 U.S. 456, 458 (1868).
66. Cradlebaugh and Sinclair to Buchanan, 16 July 1859, serial 1031, p. 8, emphasis in
original.
67. Ibid.
68. Alexander Wilson to J. S. Black, 15 November 1859, 36th Cong., 1st sess., S. Exec.
Doc. 32, serial 1031, pp. 40–42. Cradlebaugh and Sinclair would not respond to Wilson’s letter.
69. Ibid., 29.
70. Ibid., 40.
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Accessory after the Fact: The Claim That Mormons Wouldn’t
Indict Their Own in the 1859 Provo Grand Jury
According to Bagley, the 8–21 March 1859 grand jury proceedings
in Provo provide a lurid but relevant detour in the story of the massacre prosecutions. He uses the story of the grand jury to show that
Mormons obstructed prosecutions by refusing to indict their own for
the massacre and for other crimes. The book claims that the grand jury
“‘utterly refused to do anything’” about the massacre and other crimes
against non-Mormons. Thus the federal grand jury “ground to a halt”
(p. 218). The implication of Bagley’s claim is that church authorities
instructed grand jurors to obstruct voting when bills for indictment
against Mormons were presented to them. Bagley, however, has missed
primary source material which contradicts his conclusions.
This tale of the grand jury is central to one of Bagley’s more salacious themes. Blood of the Prophets paints a picture of a community
of priests dripping in gentile blood, with Mormon laity thumbing
their noses as federal authorities sought to staunch the ﬂow. Bagley
and Cradlebaugh make much of the all-Mormon Provo grand jury’s
failure to return any criminal indictments, including in the notorious Parrish and Potter case⁷¹ and the Henry Jones case. Blood of the
Prophets does not have the facts right in the Henry Jones case, confusing it with a diﬀerent and unrelated crime.⁷² Bagley tells us that
church authorities obstructed not only the massacre investigation,

71. The Parrish-Potter murders resulted from a shootout between several people in
Springville in March 1857 (pp. 75–76).
72. Although the error makes no difference to the massacre analysis, Blood of the
Prophets confuses the notorious April 1858 Henry Jones murders in Payson with another
crime in the fall of 1857 in Springville (p. 199). In the Henry Jones case, a sensational crime
widely reported in the press, three people, including an infant, were murdered. The circumstances of the crime were so lurid that nineteenth-century sources had Victorian diﬃculty
describing it. See Stenhouse, Rocky Mountain Saints, 469. Twice there were multiple indictments and once a conviction of a local law enforcement oﬃcer. See D. Michael Quinn, The
Mormon Hierarchy: Extensions of Power (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1997), 253, 537 n.
186 (I disagree with Quinn’s conclusions about the meaning of these events).
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but also the investigation of other notorious crimes for which, he
says, there were never any indictments (pp. 75–76).
The official correspondence refutes these claims. Bagley has
the facts wrong because he does not rely upon the oﬃcial ﬁles. U.S.
District Attorney Wilson’s diary (again, it was his duty to bring indictments, not Cradlebaugh’s) and his report to the U.S. attorney
general indicate that no indictment was obtained from the Provo
grand jury for the Mountain Meadows Massacre because none was
requested by the U.S. district attorney. Yes, Judge Cradlebaugh may
have asked for indictments in his initial charge, but this was an
empty request because it was not his lawful request to make. It was
U.S. District Attorney Wilson’s job alone to control the grand jury’s
reception of evidence and the timing of decision. Wilson never asked
the grand jury to indict for massacre oﬀenses. The grand jury’s term
was occupied with other crimes, and then Cradlebaugh discharged
the grand jury before Wilson could ask the grand jury to act.⁷³ An
army officer, familiar with the proceedings, opined that the reason Cradlebaugh dismissed the grand jury precipitously was not
that Cradlebaugh was upset with its performance, but that General
Johnston withdrew Cradlebaugh’s army escort.⁷⁴ In addition, when
a second grand jury was empanelled in 1859, no indictments were
sought for the massacre. Yet, Bagley would have us believe on the sole
basis of Cradlebaugh’s claims that the grand juries refused to indict
for the massacre.
Just as Bagley has the facts wrong about the 1859 grand jury’s treatment of the Mountain Meadows Massacre, so does he miss important
73. Wilson to Black, 15 November 1859, serial 1031, pp. 21–32. Instead of taking up
the massacre, the days were ﬁlled with an investigation of oﬀenses committed at Camp
Floyd, Indian rape cases, the murder of Henry Jones, and the Parrish and Potter murders.
74. In a 4 April 1859 journal entry, Captain Albert Tracy wrote: “Whatever the just
merits of the case, from either legal or moral points of view, it has been conceded by
Colonel Johnson [sic] at Camp Floyd that he will withdraw his troops from Provo. This,
leaving the court of Judge Cradlebaugh with no element of protection, necessitates the
speedy closing up of the cases in which he was making so noble a progress, together with
the retirement of himself, and his marshals and assistants to safer quarters.” Albert Tracy,
“Journal of Captain Albert Tracy,” Utah Historical Quarterly 13 (1945): 64–65.
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facts about the grand jury’s treatment of other crimes. The second 1859
grand jury handed down indictments for the Parrish and Potter and
the Henry Jones cases, yet Bagley tells us that no indictments were ever
obtained for these crimes.⁷⁵
Accessory after the Fact: The Claim That the Church Would Not
Cooperate in the Apprehension of the Fugitives
Bagley claims that high Mormon oﬃcials refused to cooperate in
apprehending the massacre fugitives. For example, Cradlebaugh reports that he told Buchanan that church oﬃcials oﬀered to produce fugitives upon condition that the church dictate the composition of the
petit juries. Bagley does not tell us that U.S. District Attorney Wilson
declared this “an unqualiﬁed falsehood.” Mormons did no such thing.⁷⁶
The federal judiciary denied Mormon law enforcement oﬃcers the
power to assist federal oﬃcers in the pursuit of criminal convictions.
Governor Cumming complained that the federal judges refused to admit to the bar federal territorial prosecutors. Indeed, Cradlebaugh and
fellow judges refused to permit the Mormon territorial attorney (even
though he was technically an oﬃcer of the United States) to enter their
courtrooms and present bills for indictments.⁷⁷
U.S. District Attorney Wilson attempted to persuade non-Mormon
Deputy U.S. Marshal William Rodgers to eﬀect service of process upon
75. As Wilson’s letter stated: “[The grand jury found a] true bill against William
Bird, for murder in the Parrish and Potter case (same case which was before the court at
Provo;) and a true bill against George W. Hancock as principal, and seven others as accessories, in the murder of Henry Jones, at Payson, in April, 1858, (same case before the
court at Provo).” Wilson to Black, 15 November 1859, serial 1031, pp. 29–32 at 32.
76. Ibid., 42.
77. A[lfred] Cumming to [Secretary of State] Lewis Cass, 1 February 1860, 36th
Cong., 1st sess., H. Exec. Doc. 78, serial 1056, pp. 43–44, emphasis removed. Governor
Cumming also noted that “perhaps one of the strongest reasons which prevents the administration of law in Utah is a conviction generally held by the people of this Territory
that the minds of the United States judges are so blinded by prejudice against them that
Mormons can hardly expect a fair and impartial decision in any case where they are concerned. Many even believe that there is a strong desire on the part of the United States
judges to convict a prisoner of crime if that prisoner be a Mormon.” Ibid.
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massacre participants. Rodgers rebuﬀed the request, claiming a lack
of resources.⁷⁸ Then, on 6 August 1858, Wilson told the federal marshal that the Mormon territorial marshal, John Kay, would accomplish
the investigations and the arrests. According to Wilson, “Kay was a
Mormon, had a knowledge of the country and of the people, and expressed a determination, if legally deputized, to make arrests if possible.” But, Rodgers refused to deputize Kay on the ground that Kay “was
a Mormon.”⁷⁹ For the federal government, a crook on the lam was better than a crook collared by a Mormon.
The federal marshal was also less than diligent, frequently complaining about a lack of pay. However, federal surveyors had no diﬃculty locating and using the services of the fugitives.⁸⁰ The surveyors’
accounts mock the progress of the investigation, recounting jokes
with and pranks upon the fugitives.⁸¹ Additionally, in 1872, the U.S.
attorney general denied a request by the U.S. district attorney to reopen the investigation of the massacre.⁸²
As another example of silly officiousness, immediately prior to
Lee’s ﬁrst trial in 1875, lawyers Jabez Sutherland and George C. Bates
oﬀered to surrender indictees William Stewart, Isaac Haight, George
Adair, and John Higbee in return for accommodating their request for
bail. U.S. District Judge Jacob Boreman was incensed with this proposal, refused it, and instead commenced disbarment proceedings
against these lawyers. Blood of the Prophets touches on this brieﬂy but
not fairly (p. 290). Although a defense lawyer may not shield a fugitive,
it is common for fugitives to negotiate the terms of their surrender
78. William H. Rodgers to [U.S. District Attorney] A[lexander] Wilson, 8 August
1859, 36th Cong., 1st sess., S. Exec. Doc. 32, serial 1031, p. 41.
79. Wilson to Black, 15 November 1859, serial 1031, p. 41.
80. Stephen V. Jones, John F. Steward, and Walter Clement Powell, “Journals,” Utah
Historical Quarterly 16–17 (1948–49): 107.
81. Frederick S. Dellenbaugh, A Canyon Voyage: A Narrative of the Second Powell
Expedition down the Green-Colorado River from Wyoming, and the Explorations on Land,
in the Years 1871 and 1872 (New Haven: Putnam’s Sons, 1908), 153.
82. George H. Williams to George C. Bates, 2 November 1872, Microﬁlm NND 170
(3015), consisting of documents obtained from Record Group (hereafter RG) 60, 123,
205, and 267, order NND 69–170 A, National Archives.
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Judge Jacob S. Boreman (1831–1913, with service in Utah from 1873 to 1889). Courtesy
Utah State Historical Society.

indirectly through lawyers. Judge Boreman’s 13 February 1875 letter to
Sutherland and Bates shows that the judiciary petulantly refused to deal
with Mormons or even attorneys for Mormons. The judge condemned
Sutherland for taking on a Mormon as a client because Mormons have
“the very soul of corruption.”⁸³ Boreman’s refusal to discuss bail is
ironic in light of the bail he later granted Lee.
Federal judges denied Mormons permission to assist federal oﬃcials with criminal prosecutions. These judges considered Mormons as
83. Jacob Boreman to [Jabez] Sutherland and [George C.] Bates, 13 February 1875,
Papers of Jacob Smith Boreman, 1857–1912, Huntington Library.
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disloyal “foreigners,”⁸⁴ as un-American, “perverted, oppressed, [and]
alien.”⁸⁵ Mormons could not be trusted to do anything, including ﬁght
crime. Avoiding collaboration with the Mormons was of greater social
value than justice.
Bagley fails to report accurately early eﬀorts at apprehension. Skipping over legitimate oﬀers of help, Bagley accuses the church of obstructing justice by frustrating the investigation. That is not appropriate, given
the evidence.
Accessory after the Fact: The Claim That Brigham Young Took No
Oﬃcial Action
Blood of the Prophets criticizes Brigham Young for doing nothing in his oﬃcial capacity to prosecute the massacre (p. 379). Young,
however, explained that he took no official governmental action
against the perpetrators because President Buchanan stripped him
of these powers and Governor Cumming possessed all the powers
of the executive.⁸⁶ Once he was stripped of civil power, the church
may have well taken the position that the Mormon prophet’s control
over wrongdoers was limited to the remedies speciﬁed in section 134
of the church’s Doctrine and Covenants. Nothing required Brigham
Young to hunt down the participants and turn them over to the very
powers seeking to jail him for bigamy (see D&C 134:4).

84. Jacob Boreman wrote: “The people generally were foreigners.” Leonard Arrington,
ed., “Crusade against Theocracy: The Reminiscences of Judge Jacob Smith Boreman of Utah,
1872–1877,” Huntington Library Quarterly 24 (November 1960): 7 n. 6. Arrington notes from
Boreman’s papers that Boreman believed that Brigham Young’s real name was “Jong” and that
his father was a British mercenary who fought the Americans in the War of 1812.
85. James B. McKean to George H. Williams, 12 November 1873, “April 1873,” RG 60,
box 1014, National Archives. “Converts from among the humble peasants of Europe are
coming here in large numbers, and are coming to stay.” Ibid.
86. Brigham Young, aﬃdavit, 30 July 1875, in Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre,
287. There were brief times after the massacre in which Brigham Young held federal executive power in Utah. Given the advance of the army, other matters consumed
Governor Young’s attention.
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There is no competent evidence of a Mormon cabal to inﬂuence
the executive branch to delay prosecution. There is much speculation, but nothing more. The Eastern press occasionally blamed the
delay upon the Buchanan and subsequent administrations.⁸⁷ The will
to prosecute was not there. Both Cradlebaugh and Wilson gave up
and left town before the Civil War.
Accessory after the Fact: Did the Church Interfere with the Lee
Trials by Hiding or Coercing Witnesses and Inﬂuencing Jurors?
Moving forward almost two decades, Blood of the Prophets argues
that the church was guilty of obstructing the prosecution of the 1875
and 1876 trials of John D. Lee. Yet Bagley errs in his analysis of the
events of the trials. He fails, with a few exceptions for the ﬁrst trial only,
to rely upon the actual transcripts. Instead, he relies upon exposés.⁸⁸
These secondhand accounts are not accurate and have serious errors
of omission and editorial addition. In particular, I object to Bagley’s
reliance upon William Bishop’s Mormonism Unveiled for the second
trial. Bishop’s stenographer dropped and changed testimony in places.
Abraham Lincoln’s biographers have recognized the diﬃculty of using
press accounts as they reconstructed the accessory-after-the-fact trial
of Dr. Samuel Mudd, the physician who set John Wilkes Booth’s leg.⁸⁹
87. “The reason of this long delay, this stubborn deafness to the demands of justice,
this contemptuous . . . investigation of the Mountain Meadows Massacre was not had at
once, and subsequent administrations cannot escape from a share in the same responsibility.” Undated St. Louis Republican editorial quoted in Fielding, Tribune Reports, 189.
88. For the ﬁrst trial in 1875, Blood of the Prophets cites nothing more than sensational paraphrases of the testimony by the Salt Lake Daily Tribune eleven times, Beadle’s
exposé four times, and the actual transcript four times (pp. 433–44). Bagley cites
“[Lockley, Frederic]. The Lee Trial. Salt Lake City: Tribune Printing Co., 1875,” which is
actually The Lee Trial!: An exposé of the Mountain Meadows massacre: being a condensed
report of the prisoner’s statement, testimony of witnesses, charge of the judge, arguments of
counsel, and opinions of the press upon the trial by the Salt Lake Daily Tribune reporter
(Salt Lake City: Tribune Printing, 1875).
89. Edward Steers Jr., His Name Is Still Mudd: The Case against Dr. Samuel Alexander
Mudd (Gettysburg: Thomas, 1997), 156 nn. 31 and 32.
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In contrast to Bagley, neither Brooks nor Leonard Arrington relied on
press accounts for their analyses of the Lee trial.⁹⁰
Blood of the Prophets also relies on the memoirs of Judge Jacob
Boreman for his impressions of the trial. Except for perhaps the demeanor of witnesses, a judge’s observations of witnesses could not
add anything to the oﬃcial transcript. Boreman’s reminiscences demonstrate some real problems. With not a shred of evidence other than
the speculation circulated by others, Boreman said he believed that
high Mormon oﬃcials communicated death threats to witnesses of
the massacre and that ordinary members of the church believed they
were authorized to commit perjury by reason of the vows they took
in the church’s Endowment House. None of that is reﬂected in the
trial transcript. Arrington opined that Boreman was prepared to believe the worst about the Mormons and that his naïveté made him
clay in the hands of other federal anti-Mormon fanatics.⁹¹
Turning to the events of the ﬁrst trial in 1875, there is no evidence that the church obstructed justice. This trial mistried with a
hung jury, to the universal denunciation of the church in the nonMormon press. All Mormon jurors and one “backslider” voted to
acquit. Three non-Mormons voted to convict (p. 296). Not a single
witness tied Lee to any criminal activity, including former Mormon
Bishop Philip Klingensmith, who turned state’s evidence.⁹² The prosecutors, William C. Carey and Robert Baskin, used the trial to grandstand against Brigham Young.⁹³ Even the Salt Lake Daily Tribune
admitted that the trial failure resulted from the prosecutors’ “utter
neglect of the business” and “disgraceful lethargy.”⁹⁴
90. Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 294; Arrington, “Crusade against Theocracy,” 4.
91. Arrington, “Crusade against Theocracy,” 36 n. 55.
92. Trial Transcript (1875). I have read this transcript with a critical eye. The absence
of evidence made his testimony seem silly.
93. Ibid.
94. “The Mountain Meadows Murderers Admitted to Bail: The Incompetency of the
United States to Try Criminals in Utah Admitted,” Salt Lake Daily Tribune, 12 May 1876,
quoted in Fielding, Tribune Reports, 204.
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Accessory after the Fact: Did the Church and the Prosecutor
Obstruct Justice with a Deal in the 1876 Trial to Forgo Any
Other Prosecutions?
Blood of the Prophets tells us that the U.S. district attorney’s oﬃce
struck a deal with the church: they would oﬀer John D. Lee as a scapegoat to avoid all further prosecutions, and in return the church would
help convict Lee in a second trial. For critics of the church (and I would
put Blood of the Prophets in this category), the deal and scapegoat story
helps sell the idea that the church was not above thwarting justice. For
advocates of John D. Lee (and I would put Brooks in this category), the
deal and the scapegoat theory helps sell the idea that an innocent Lee
was willing to suﬀer as a martyr for his friends and church.
The deal is important to Bagley’s conclusions. He says: “In a
case that threatened to shake the LDS church to its foundations, the
prosecutor found he could only secure a guilty verdict with the cooperation of Mormon authorities. As attorneys do, Howard made a
deal” (p. 300). As part of this deal, the church assisted Howard with
manufactured evidence and manipulated justice (p. 299). Bagley
also tells us that U.S. District Attorney Howard was “ ‘on the make,’ ”
or in other words, had been bribed or threatened with blackmail by
church leaders (p. 299).
Bagley’s failures in this area are the same as Brooks’s and the Salt
Lake Daily Tribune’s. The latter ﬁrst ﬂoated this theory on 27 September
1876, citing only supposition.⁹⁵ So Bagley is in good company.
In this section, we will examine the law, which demonstrates that
any deal would have been a worthless nullity. We will then look at the
evidence Bagley oﬀers to support his theory of a deal, to show that
his evidence lacks proper foundation and is thus not reliable. Lastly,
95. The paper reports that a deal had to be inferred from the facts that Howard had
dismissed the charges against William Dame, that Howard had selected an all-Mormon
jury, and that in his opening statement he stated that he had no evidence to indict higher
church authorities. The Salt Lake Daily Tribune also pointed to Howard’s disparagement
of the Liberal party, which was so closely aﬃliated with the Tribune. “A Word in Defense,”
Salt Lake Daily Tribune, 27 September 1876, p. 2, col. 1.
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we will see from an overwhelming amount of oﬃcial correspondence
that Howard’s later actions were inconsistent with any “deal.”
The Law Pertaining to Agreements to Thwart Justice. A “deal” to
thwart justice would have been a legal impossibility, a nullity, void
at the outset, and obligating nobody. Under English and American
common law, certain agreements such as agreements to collect gambling debts incurred in nongambling jurisdictions, to pay for a prostitute, or not to report a crime are unenforceable. Another example of
an unenforceable agreement is an agreement to forbear prosecution
of a crime.⁹⁶ In U.S. v. Ford, an 1878 U.S. Supreme Court decision,
the court summarized the law of forbearance of prosecution. A grant
of immunity must be approved by a judge and is granted only to accomplices willing to come forward and testify in good faith against an
accused. On the other hand, the court said that an executive pardon
does not require approval by a judge or does not constitute an agreement to come forward to testify, but it does require a presidential act.
A pardon usually comes only after conviction of the to-be-pardoned
felon.⁹⁷ Thus, the two kinds of deals approved by the Supreme Court
require an oﬃcial stamp of approval by persons other than the prosecutor; secret deals would not work.
Before the Supreme Court’s 1878 decision, grants of immunity were
questionable. Prevailing law before U.S. v. Ford suggested that a grant of
immunity might not have been enforceable if the person granted immunity “appear[ed] to have been the principal oﬀender” and that the best
one could hope for was an “equitable” claim to a presidential pardon.⁹⁸
Howard would also have known that an unlawful grant of immunity may
have been a crime itself; he could have been subject to prosecution.⁹⁹ He
96. Nickelson v. Wilson, 60 N.Y. 362 (N.Y. 1875); Cameron v. McFarland, 4 N.C. 299.
97. U.S. v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594–606 (1878).
98. U.S. v. Lee, 4 McLean 103, 26 F. Cas. 910–11 (C.C.D.Ill. 1846). In U.S. v. Lee, the federal prosecutor was of the view that the most a grant of immunity could give was an equitable
claim to a pardon and a delay in prosecution. U.S. v. Lee advanced the judicial notion that a
court, upon application, could grant immunity to a witness less culpable than the accused.
99. U.S. v. Daniel, 19 U.S. 542–49 (1821) held that a person who has admissible
knowledge of a crime but withholds it may be subject to misdemeanor prosecution for
misprision of felony.
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was obviously knowledgeable in the area because he appears to have offered John D. Lee a presidential pardon after Lee’s conviction.¹⁰⁰
Any subsequent U.S. district attorney, or even Howard himself,
could have simply ignored a deal to thwart justice and could have
prosecuted any person worthy of prosecution. Therefore, if a deal to
thwart justice was a nullity at the outset, it seems unlikely that a competent lawyer would have spent any eﬀort reaching such a deal.
Bagley’s Evidence of a Deal. Turning to Bagley’s evidence of a deal to
make John D. Lee a scapegoat (which really is unnecessary to discuss,
given the legal impossibility of such a deal in the ﬁrst place), we ﬁnd it
wanting. For example, there is no evidence whatsoever, other than reported rumor, that U.S. District Attorney Sumner Howard was bribed.
Nor is there evidence that witnesses were told what to say. Bagley,
as does Brooks, says that “according to . . . family traditions,” Nephi
Johnson and Jacob Hamblin received letters ordering them to testify and “telling them what to say” (p. 304). “Family traditions” are
not evidence. I would like to see the letters. What would they have
shown? That witnesses were told to lie about Lee’s guilt when Lee was
not really guilty? It is unlikely that Lee was not guilty.¹⁰¹ Although
there may indeed have been letters telling witnesses to cooperate, it is
doubtful that the letters instructed them what to say.
As further evidence of a deal, Bagley examines Hamblin’s role
in the second trial.¹⁰² Bagley and the Salt Lake Daily Tribune attack,
100. Whitney, History of Utah, 2:824.
101. Lee said in his confession published posthumously: “It was my duty, with the
two drivers, to kill the sick and wounded who were in the wagons, and to do so when we
heard the guns of the troops ﬁre. . . . As we heard the guns, I ordered a halt and we proceeded to do our part.” John D. Lee, in Bishop, Mormonism Unveiled, 241.
102. Trial Transcript, People of the Territory of Utah v. John D. Lee (1876), Utah State
Historical Society, MS B915, Charles Peterson copy, 86–101. Jacob Hamblin was not present at the massacre. Hamblin was the head of the Indian mission to the southern territory, and he was away at the time of the massacre. He did not, however, exactly escape the
massacre with his reputation intact. A seven-year-old survivor, Rebecca Dunlap, identiﬁed Hamblin as a participant. Hartt Wixom, Hamblin: A Modern Look at the Frontier Life
and Legend of Jacob Hamblin (Springville, Utah: Cedar Fort, 1996), 84. None of the other
perpetrators ever identiﬁed Hamblin as being present. Ibid., 85. Bagley refers brieﬂy to
Dunlap’s sighting of Hamblin but rightly dismisses it (p. 148).
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in particular, Hamblin’s testimony that Lee confessed to him and
the fact that Hamblin never mentioned the confession to investigating law enforcement oﬃcers.¹⁰³ They claim that Lee’s confession to
Hamblin never occurred, and they have suggested that church ofﬁcials orchestrated Hamblin’s testimony to secure Lee’s conviction.
Brooks agreed with Bagley’s later assessment that Hamblin’s testimony was selectively truthful and that he “could not remember what
he did not want to tell.”¹⁰⁴
The transcript shows that no lawyer in the second trial pushed
Hamblin to say very much although Hamblin said he had more to tell.
Each side was undoubtedly fearful to ask questions that would elicit
previously unknown answers.¹⁰⁵ Either side could have asked the court
to order Hamblin, upon pain of contempt, to tell it all. Neither side did.
Had I been the prosecutor, I would not want Hamblin to say anything
that might possibly implicate Brigham Young because, in that event, I
would have followed the same unsuccessful strategy of grandstanding
against Brigham Young as did U.S. District Attorneys William Carey
and Robert Baskin in the 1875 trial. Similarly, because Hamblin was
under the control of the prosecution, as Lee’s defense lawyer I would
not know what Hamblin would say. In this particular case, less was
more. There is no evidence that Hamblin lied; in fact, Hamblin’s recent
biographer, Hartt Wixom, takes exception to the charge of perjury.¹⁰⁶
Lee’s attorney, Bishop, admitted that Hamblin was an honest man,¹⁰⁷
103. Salt Lake Daily Tribune, 24 September 1876, in Fielding, Tribune Reports, 240–41.
104. Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 198.
105. Hamblin testiﬁed: “Q. Are you certain you have told all you know about it? A. Yes,
sir, I am certain I know all I tell. Q. Answer the other part? A. I think I have. Everything
of importance. Q. Have you told it all? A. No sir. Q. Tell the balance? A. I would not kile
[sic] to undertake it.” Trial Transcript (1876), 114.
106. Wixom, Hamblin, 144.
107. As Lee’s attorney Bishop argued in closing: “Jake comes on the stand and testiﬁes
as carefully and considered as it is possible for a man to testify.” “His memory was good.”
Bishop needed Hamblin to be a truthful witness because he used Hamblin’s testimony
to contrast against allegedly inconsistent conduct on the part of Brigham Young. Trial
Transcript, People of the Territory of Utah v. John D. Lee (1876), Papers of Jacob Smith
Boreman, 1857–1912, “1876 Huntington Trial Transcript,” Huntington Library, box 2,
book 4, p. 20; see also Wixom, Hamblin, 155.
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even though Lee contended that Hamblin’s testimony was false.¹⁰⁸ The
press may have wished that Hamblin had said more, but Hamblin was
not talking to the press.
A juror’s dream has not the slightest chance of constituting evidence, but Bagley oﬀers it to us as such (p. 306). Blood of the Prophets
uses juror Andrew Corry’s recollection of a conversation he had with
another juror about that juror’s dream that Lee would be oﬀered as a
scapegoat. When Corry executed his aﬃdavit in 1932 he was eightyfour years old. He had probably been pursued for ﬁfty-six years by
persons interested in having him support a particular view. The afﬁdavit looks to be too ﬁne a production.¹⁰⁹
Corry’s aﬃdavit, nonetheless, is compelling to me in a way Blood of
the Prophets would not appreciate. Corry does not claim any external
108. John D. Lee to Emma B. Lee, 21 September 1876, in Samuel N. Henrie, ed.,
Writings of John D. Lee, 2nd ed. (Tucson, Ariz.: Fenestra Books, 2002), 408.
109. A partial text of Corry’s statement: “I came to Utah when I was two years old and
have lived here for eighty-three years, and I have been through the mill. I knew John D.
Lee very well and many a time I have stayed at his home. I was on the jury that convicted
him, and I was the last man to give in to have him executed. President Young furnished the
evidence and the witnesses that convicted John D. Lee. Do you believe it? It is true nevertheless. I know for I was there at the court at the time of the trial. It was the same as Nephi
killing Laban. Better for one man to die than for a whole nation to dwindle in unbelief. John
D. Lee was the sacriﬁce. He paid the penalty, but just the same he was a good man. They
never published that thing correctly. I know John D. Lee was not altogether to blame. He
was caught in the snare. I couldn’t give in with the jury. Granger took me to one side and
talked and reasoned with me, but I felt miserable, just as though the devil had some power
over me. Finally S. S. Barton, a juror, told me a dream he had. ‘We, the jury, were all in a
ﬁeld harvesting, and had our riﬂes with us. A ﬂock of blackbirds rose up from everywhere
and scattered away.’ These blackbirds represented the apostates and the mob. They wanted
Brigham Young, and John D. Lee knew it. It meant that some one must be the white goose.
As in the dream, a ﬂock of white geese ﬂew by and we shot at them, killing one. Then the
great ﬂock of blackbirds rose. Lee was the white goose. I still disliked very much to give in
to the jury for I know that Lee was not the only one responsible for the dead, and some one
had to be sacriﬁced, so at last I gave in, and immediately I felt so relieved and happy that
I gave in and the evil inﬂuence left me. Lee was as much a sacriﬁce for the Church as any
man had ever been. The Lord did the best He could at all times with the people He had to
work with. The Lord has been merciful to me and has shown me the Gospel and I am grateful to him for doing so.” Andrew Corry, aﬃdavit, 11 March 1932, in Edna Lee Brimhall,
“Gleanings concerning John D. Lee” (unpublished, 1958), MS 6313, Church Archives, and
at Northern Arizona University Library, pp. 52–54. Though riveting, this is not evidence.
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pressure to vote for Lee’s conviction. He does not mention any pressure
by any church authority to vote a particular way. He does not mention
a deal. Corry dwells on the scapegoat theory, but that theory was the
only defense theory oﬀered by Lee’s attorneys and the only possible
theory for the jurors to debate. It seems that ﬁfty-six years would have
uncovered a claim of church pressure, given Corry’s willingness to spill
all in his aﬃdavit.
Blood of the Prophets tells us that William Bishop, Lee’s attorney,
claims that he had an agreement with local church authorities to select particular persons as jurors (p. 302). According to Bishop:
The attorneys for the defendant had been furnished with a
list of the jurymen, and the list was examined by a committee of Mormons, who marked those who would convict with
a dash (—), those who would rather not convict with a star
(*), and those were certain to acquit John D. Lee, under all
circumstances, with two stars (**).¹¹⁰
If Bishop asserts, which he really does not, that local church leaders
agreed with him to dictate to jurors the outcome of the case, Bishop
would be admitting to a crime at the most and grounds for disbarment at the least.
Blood of the Prophets recounts a story by Frank Lee that each juror favorable to Lee’s cause would have a “star pinned under his arm”
so that Bishop would know “whom to choose” (p. 302). I don’t trust
this evidence. According to genealogical records, and Bagley does not
mention this, Frank Lee would have been barely thirteen years old by
the time of the second trial¹¹¹ when he claims that this information
was conveyed “in the Council meeting.”¹¹² Frank Lee does not say
he was at the meeting. A thirteen-year-old boy, one who had lived
in isolation his entire life with his mother Rachel, would not likely
110. Bishop, Mormonism Unveiled, 33.
111. Lorraine R. Manderscheid, Some Descendants of John Doyle Lee (Bellevue, Wash.:
Family Research and Development, 1996), ch. 7.
112. William Franklin Lee, statement, 28 February 1931, in Brimhall, “Gleanings concerning John D. Lee,” 21–23.
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understand the intricacies of conspiracies to suborn perjury. How
many of the dozens or hundreds of potential jurors would have been
trained to display their underarms only to Bishop? What would the
stars have looked like? Frank Lee undoubtedly misheard secondhand
family accounts of Bishop’s list of potential jurors.¹¹³
It certainly is not unusual for an experienced trial lawyer in a
small town to compile a list of dozens of known veniremen (someone
who is summoned to serve on a jury) and rank them according to
their proclivities. A trial lawyer will use many sources to learn facts
about these potential jurors. Even an experienced lawyer might get
too close to potential jurors in the pretrial phase, as Clarence Darrow
learned when he was indicted in 1911 in Los Angeles for allegedly offering money to a potential juror before jurors were called.¹¹⁴ Bishop
probably analyzed the pretrial jury pool. His friendly sources were
sympathetic Mormons in the community who probably identiﬁed to
him and Lee those veniremen who might vote Lee’s way.
Bagley and the press also cite as evidence of a deal the fact that
an all-Mormon jury was selected for the ﬁrst trial. Obviously, the argument goes, an all-Mormon jury could be controlled by the church
more easily than a part-Mormon jury. Lee’s attorney advanced this
theory during closing argument. Howard replied by explaining that it
was Lee’s attorney, not the prosecution, who had struck non-Mormons
from the panel. Bishop, said Howard, “was very anxious to get
every Gentile oﬀ the jury; and I kept striking oﬀ Mormons.”¹¹⁵ Because
Mormons outnumbered non-Mormons by a huge margin, and because
113. Another one of Rachel and John’s children, Amorah, was nineteen years old on
the date of the second trial. She said in a family statement that she crawled on hands and
knees with a friend to eavesdrop on a “council” meeting wherein “the jury was composed
of Mormon men and the jurymen chosen were those who wore a star.” Amorah Lee
Smithson, statement, 18 February 1930, in Brimhall, “Gleanings concerning John D. Lee,”
27. I think Amorah got the story wrong and repeated it to her family. It is more likely that
Bishop had a list of potential jurors, with the ones he wanted marked with a star, and that
is the story Amorah heard, and which she later repeated to Frank.
114. Irving Stone, Clarence Darrow for the Defense: A Biography (1941; reprint, New
York: Signet Classic, 1971), 344–79.
115. “1876 Huntington Trial Transcript,” Huntington Library, box 2, book 5, p. 1.
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challenges to jurors are typically limited to a certain number per side,
it would have been relatively easy for one side to unilaterally control
the religious makeup of the jury. According to the uncontested trial
transcript, it was Lee’s attorney who did this and not, as Bagley argues,
Howard. Bishop’s unilateral selection of an all-Mormon jury (obviously,
a smart thing to do since Mormons had previously voted to acquit) is
an important fact in this story that Bagley misses.
Other than the unilateral ability to strike a limited number
of jurors, neither party had control over the selection of the jury.
According to press reports, the selection process was trilateral, with
each side and the court having its say.¹¹⁶ It would be diﬃcult to corrupt an entire jury pool for the twelve who would be empanelled. In
any event, there was no limit to public and press contact with the jurors after the trial. After years of controversy over this case, as far as
I know, no juror claimed to have been part of a conspiracy or to have
received instructions from church authorities.¹¹⁷
Bagley also cites Judge Boreman himself for evidence of a deal:
The deal [Sumner Howard] struck with Brigham Young troubled even Howard. On the ﬁrst day of the trial, the prosecutor stopped Judge Boreman as he was going to court. “Judge,
I have eaten dirt & I have gone down out of sight in dirt & expect to eat more dirt.” (p. 301)
Boreman never believed Howard had made a deal, as I will show
from correspondence discussed below. Nonetheless, the conversation
quoted above says nothing of consequence. Boreman does not claim
116. “The Material That Mormon Juries Are Composed of,—The Tallest Old Liar in
Southern Utah.—The Whole Court Astounded at the Revelations.—Some Things Which
Look Passing Strange to a Man Up a Tree,” Salt Lake Daily Tribune, 14 September 1876, in
Fielding, Tribune Reports, 211–12.
117. In a secondhand account, which Bagley does not mention, Edna Lee Brimhall
claims juror Walter Granger told her in 1931 that the jury was “pledged to ﬁnd a verdict
of ‘guilty.’ ” Brimhall, “Gleanings concerning John D. Lee,” 4. The year 1931 was the year she
collected aﬃdavits and statements to support her unpublished work; there is no aﬃdavit
from Granger. Even so, in this secondhand account, Granger does not mention speciﬁc
external pressure from church authorities.
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this to be evidence of any deal and even admits that another witness
to the conversation denied it.¹¹⁸ Bagley tells us that Howard’s disclosure troubled Boreman, but there is no evidence of this.
Finally, Bagley tells us that “prevailing wisdom had it that the LDS
church would dictate the outcome” and that one of Brigham Young’s sons,
John W. Young, took bets on the Chicago Board of Trade as to the outcome. Bagley’s source for these two statements is the muckraking reporter
John Beadle (p. 296).¹¹⁹ No serious scholar would accept as “prevailing wisdom” the conclusions of reporters for modern newspapers. Why should we
accept John Beadle for “prevailing wisdom?” Admittedly, John W. Young
may have been a colorful character,¹²⁰ but I wouldn’t rely on Beadle for the
account of bets taken on the Chicago Board of Trade.
Evidence Refuting the Deal, Which Bagley Ignores. In the analysis
above, we have seen that the U.S. district attorney would never have
entered into a deal to thwart justice because he would have known it
would have been unenforceable. We have also seen that Bagley’s evidence of a deal is without foundation.
Looking at the evidence refuting the notion of a deal, we ﬁnd it is
substantial. For years after the start of the Lee trial, until at least as late
as 1884, federal prosecutors and investigators actively sought to bring
other massacre participants to justice. Had the church and federal
prosecutors struck a deal that only Lee would be prosecuted, we should
expect that all parties to the deal would act thereafter in a manner consistent with a deal. None of the parties acted in such a manner.
The Salt Lake Daily Tribune reports the church’s call for continued prosecutions on 23 September 1876.¹²¹ A few days later and after
118. Boreman Journal, in Arrington, “Crusade against Theocracy,” 42.
119. Beadle, Western Wilds, 512.
120. On 6 October 1876, John W. Young (1844–1924) replaced George A. Smith in the
First Presidency upon the latter’s death. The Salt Lake Daily Tribune claimed that John W.
Young was a rake. Brigham Young relied upon his son for his business acumen in railroading and mining. Dean C. Jessee, ed., Letters of Brigham Young to His Sons (Salt Lake City:
Deseret Book, 1974), 91–93.
121. Deseret News editorial, as reviewed in “The Work Done at Last,” Salt Lake Daily
Tribune, 23 September 1857, p. 1, col. 2.
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Lee’s conviction, the Tribune on 27 September 1876 published a summary of its grounds for believing that Howard had cut a deal with the
church.¹²² One day after the Tribune’s accusation, and most likely in
response to the Tribune’s charges, Howard described to the U.S. attorney general meetings with the church in which he lobbied for assistance in locating witnesses. “That aid was given.” Howard also told
the church authorities that he had no present evidence against them.
Howard also complained of political intrigue from former prosecutors to malign his successful eﬀorts.¹²³
122. “A Word in Defense,” Salt Lake Daily Tribune, 27 September 1876, p. 2, col. 1.
123. “Hon Alphonso Taft, Attorney General[;] Washington City D.C.[;] Sir[:] The trial of
John D. Lee indicted for murder committed at the Mountain Meadows in September 1857,
has just been held at this place and the result is a verdict of ‘guilty of murder in the ﬁrst degree.’
The result seems to be displeasing to certain factionists here who have heretofore conducted
this case and those connected with the ‘Mountain Meadow Massacre’ with reference more to
outside matters than to the cause at bar. It has been [their] public boast that the former trial
of John D. Lee in July 1875 was not for the purpose of convicting the prisoner, but to ﬁx the
[crime] of the Mountain Meadow butchery upon the Mormon Church. The result was the call
for a large amount of public money, and no result except the advancement of certain schemes
and aspirations of local politicians whose attitude is that of uniform condemnation of the administration and its appointees. In the trial just concluded, the case of John D. Lee, and that
alone was tried. It became apparent early in the investigation, that there is no evidence whatsoever to connect the chief authorities of the Mormon Church with the Massacre, on the contrary those authorities produced documents and other evidence showing clearly that not only
was that great crime solely an individual oﬀense on the part of those who committed it, but
that the orders, letters[,] proclamations etc. which issued from the central Mormon authority
which was also at that time the Territorial authority were directly and positively contrary to
all shedding of blood, not only of emigrants passing through the Territory, but also forbade
the killing of the Soldiers of Johnsons [sic] Army which was marching on Utah. Being satisﬁed of this the prosecution laid the case before the Mormon leaders and ask[ed] their aid in
unraveling the mystery of this foul crime. That aid was given and the horrid testimony is public from the mouths of eye witnesses, convicting the prisoner without the shadow of a doubt.
Those whose thunder is stolen by this conviction and the ﬁxing of the crime where the evidence places it, and who failure in the same prosecution before, are exceeding angry, and are
making to the public such misrepresentations as their Malice suggests and are said to be also
forwarding certain of their statements to Washington. It seems marvelous that any set of men
should reject the conviction of the chief butcher of Mountain Meadows, but disappointment
and envy, together with the loss of political capital, will drive men into strange positions. The
outline of the case is reported to you herein with the assurance that nothing has been done in
the management of the prosecution of which any oﬃcer of the government high or low, need
be ashamed. William Nelson, U.S. Marshal[;] Sumner Howard, U.S. District Attorney. William

Beaver City, Utah
Oct. 24, 1876
The forwarding of this letter of Wm Howard to Atty
Genl Taft has been by me unavoidably detained.
It should have gone forward some days since.
The parties refer[r]ed to therein have been ﬂeeing
from justice over two years. Several unsuccessful
eﬀorts have been made for their arrest. I am gratiﬁed
that Wm Howard intends to leave no eﬀorts untried
to secure their capture and I hope that he will be
seconded in his eﬀorts by the Department of Justice;
and I think that these men can with proper diligence,
through the aid of a detective, be arrested and
brought to justice.
Jacob S. Boreman
Associate Justice Supreme Court
of Utah
Judge Jacob S. Boreman to U.S. Attorney General Taft, 24 October 1876.
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On 4 and 5 October 1876, U.S. District Attorney Howard wrote to
U.S. Attorney General Alphonso Taft and explained his plans to arrest
Haight, Higbee, and Stewart.¹²⁴ Judge Boreman endorsed the 5 October letter with a note of his own (reproduced on p. 241) to Taft.¹²⁵
The letter from Boreman to the U.S. attorney general shows several things that are fundamentally inconsistent with Bagley’s theories
about the deal. On the one hand, Bagley tells us that Boreman and
Howard were troubled with the deal Howard had to make to thwart
justice for other perpetrators (p. 301). On the other hand, the ofﬁcial correspondence shows that Boreman endorsed Howard’s plan
for further pursuit and arrest. Boreman agreed with Howard’s progress. Under Bagley’s view of the facts, Boreman should have called for
Howard’s ouster. It seems Bagley has this completely wrong.
The evidence from oﬃcial sources mounts against Bagley’s and
Brooks’s theory of a deal. Taft authorized additional personnel to
support Howard’s and Boreman’s request.¹²⁶ U.S. Marshal William
Nelson told Alphonso Taft on 19 December 1876 of the discovery of
physical evidence in California, asking the Justice Department help
to retrieve it.¹²⁷ On 12 February 1877, Howard told Taft that Howard
Nelson and Sumner Howard to Alphonso Taft, 28 September 1876, General Records of the
Department of Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters,” RG 60, box
1015, National Archives.
124. Sumner Howard to Alphonso Taft, 5 October 1876, General Records of the
Department of Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters,” in Source
Chronological Files 1871–74, RG 60, box 1015, National Archives; Sumner Howard to
Alphonso Taft, 4 October 1876, General Records of the Department of Justice, Letters
Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters,” in Source Chronological Files 1871–74,
RG 60, box 1015, National Archives.
125. Jacob S. Boreman to U.S. Attorney General Taft, 24 October 1876, General
Records of the Department of Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre
Letters,” in Source Chronological Files 1871–74, RG 60, box 1015, National Archives.
126. Alphonso Taft to Sumner Howard, 8 November 1876, Records of the Department
of Justice, RG 60, M 701, reel 7, Instruction Book G, National Archives. “Complying with
your request, which is seconded by the recommendations of Judge Boreman I have this
day commissioned John S. Sargent as Special Agent of this Department to perform the
services as set forth in your letter.” Ibid.
127. William Nelson to Alphonso Taft, 19 December 1876, Microfilm NND 170
(3015), consisting of documents obtained from RG 60, 123, 205 and 267, order NND 69–
170 A, National Archives.
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had located a possible eyewitness to the massacre, a Fancher child,
now an adult languishing in the penitentiary for robbery. Howard
asked Taft for help from the Justice Department to corroborate the
witness’s identity. The secretary of war responded with the information requested.¹²⁸
On 23 February 1877, Boreman communicated to Howard a desire to spend more money on the marshal’s eﬀorts to intercept the
other perpetrators before they ﬂed to New Mexico.¹²⁹ Howard and
Nelson wrote to Taft on 3 March to urge that “the importance of
availing ourselves of every reasonable means to bring others equally
guilty to trial—is apparent. The trial of Lee has resulted in developments that give us a reasonable hope that the others—if arrested can
be convicted.”¹³⁰
Taft’s successor, Attorney General Charles Devens, responded to the
correspondence of the third and questioned whether a ﬁve-hundreddollar reward requested for the arrest of Haight, Higbee, and Stewart
would be wasted.¹³¹ Lee was executed four days later on 23 March 1877.
Three days after the execution, Howard recommended to
Devens that undercover oﬃcers be used to eﬀect the remaining arrests.¹³² On 2 May 1877, after learning that George C. Bates, Lee’s
128. Sumner Howard to Alphonso Taft, 26 February 1877, Records Relating to the
Mountain Meadows Massacre of September 13, 1857, Records of the Adjutant General’s
Office, RG 94, Record and Pension Office file 751395; [Secretary of War] George W.
McCrary to Attorney General [Alphonso Taft], 23 February 1877, Records Relating to the
Mountain Meadows Massacre of September 13, 1857, Records of the Adjutant General’s
Oﬃce, RG 94, Record and Pension Oﬃce ﬁle 751395.
129. Jacob Boreman to Sumner Howard, 23 February 1877, Records of the Department
of Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters,” RG 60, box 1019,
National Archives.
130. Sumner Howard and William Nelson to Alphonso Taft, 3 March 1877, Records of
the Department of Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters,” RG
60, box 1019, National Archives.
131. Charles Devens to Sumner Howard, 16 March 1877, Records of the Department
of Justice, RG 60, M 701, reel 7, Instruction Book G, National Archives.
132. Sumner Howard to Charles Devens, 16 April 1877, Records of the Department of
Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters 1877,” RG 60, box 1019,
National Archives.
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former attorney, wished a special appointment to attempt the apprehension of Haight, Higbee, and Stewart, Howard complained to
Devens that Bates’s proposal was “another of Brigham Young’s . . .
games to thwart the oﬃcers” in their arrests.¹³³ Why would Howard
have condemned the “games” of Brigham Young to thwart further
arrests if Howard had agreed, as Bagley and Brooks say, to forgo all
arrests?
On 20 October 1877, over one year after the deal Bagley claims
the government made to thwart justice, Howard’s assistant and
Boreman petitioned the president of the United States for additional
appropriations for a special agent.¹³⁴ Howard wrote Devens, disagreeing with his assistant, asking that the money instead be spent on
undercover agents who could approach the fugitives by stealth.¹³⁵
After Howard resigned in February 1878 to pursue a respected
career in law and politics in Michigan, federal eﬀorts to arrest Haight,
Higbee, and Stewart continued. Boreman wrote to Devens on 1 January
133. Sumner Howard to Charles Devens, 2 May 1877, Records of the Department of
Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters 1877,” RG 60, box 1019,
National Archives. Bates’s proposal was not a game, but a highly unethical proposal to turn
on his former clients Haight, Higbee, and Stewart. He apparently sought to retaliate against
the men and the church for an unspeciﬁed oﬀense, but it appears to relate to a falling out
with his partner, Jabez Sutherland. Bates told Judge Boreman: “All those other men now
under indictment are as guilty as old John D. Lee himself, and they can be, and ought to
be captured, brought into Court, tried, convicted and sentenced to death, and I possess the
power to aid in the accomplishment of that event. They have sold me out, turned their back
upon me, and put thier [sic] case into the hands of Sutherland, who intrigues with others
to let them escape.” George C. Bates to Jacob S. Boreman, 9 March 1877, Records of the
Department of Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters 1877,” RG
60, box 1019, National Archives. Judge Boreman saw Bates for what he was. “He cannot
be trusted with the arrest of any one. He is totally unreliable.” Jacob S. Boreman to Charles
Devens, 25 April 1877, Records of the Department of Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain
Meadows Massacre Letters 1877,” RG 60, box 1019, National Archives.
134. Presley Denny, C. M. Hawley, and Charles M. Howard (with endorsement
by Jacob S. Boreman) to the President of the United States, 20 October 1877 (date received by Department of Justice), Records of the Department of Justice, Letters Received,
“Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters 1877,” RG 60, box 1019, National Archives.
135. Sumner Howard to Charles Devens, 8 November 1877, Records of the
Department of Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters 1877,” RG
60, box 1019, National Archives.
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1879 with a request for additional appropriations. “The arrest of these
men has been delayed so long that the people are not anticipating any
eﬀort in that way. This then would be a suitable time to make the arrests.” Eleven months later, Devens approved the request.¹³⁶ In 1884, or
almost seven years after Bagley claims a deal was made to frustrate further prosecutions, an acting attorney general conﬁrmed Utah inquiries
from the U.S. marshal that reward money was still oﬀered for the arrests of Haight, Higbee, and Stewart.¹³⁷
Thus all of this post–Lee-conviction activity by the prosecutor’s ofﬁce and the judiciary would have made no sense whatsoever if all agreed
and understood there was a deal to thwart justice. What is the answer
from Young critics and Lee advocates on this point? Was it all a subterfuge involving two federal prosecutors, a federal judge, several U.S. marshals, a secretary of war, and at least three U.S. attorneys general?
When Bagley gets to this postconviction oﬃcial action, his analysis is stunted, missing nearly all the correspondence mentioned above.
He relies solely on a doctoral dissertation by Rev. Robert Joseph Dwyer
later published as The Gentile Comes to Utah: A Study in Religious and
Social Conﬂict (1862–1890).¹³⁸ This is a weak work, at least when it discusses post-Lee oﬃcial action, because Dwyer lacked many of the ofﬁcial sources I have cited above. Nonetheless, with the limited sources
Dwyer possessed, he does not conclude that a deal had been struck between prosecutors and the church.
136. Sumner Howard to Charles Devens, Records of the Department of Justice, Letters
Received, 2 January 1878, “January 1878 to February 1878,” RG 60, box 1020, National
Archives; Jacob Boreman to Charles Devens, 7 January 1879, Papers of Jacob Smith Boreman,
1857–1912, Huntington Library; Charles Devens to Jacob S. Boreman, 15 December 1879,
Papers of Jacob Smith Boreman, 1857–1912, Huntington Library.
137. E. A. Ireland to [Attorney General] B. H. Brewster, 18 January 1884, Microﬁlm
NND 170 (3015), consisting of documents obtained from RG 60, 123, 205, and 267, order NND 69–170 A, National Archives; [Acting Attorney General] S. J. Phillips to E. A.
Ireland, 25 January 1884, Microﬁlm NND 170 (3015), consisting of documents obtained
from RG 60, 123, 205 and 267, order NND 69–170 A, National Archives.
138. Robert J. Dwyer, The Gentile Comes to Utah: A Study in Religious and Social
Conﬂict (1862–1890), rev. 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Publishers, 1971).
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What annoyed me most about Bagley’s use of Dwyer’s work is
that Bagley chose to cut and paste Dwyer’s own words into Blood of
the Prophets although Dwyer does not reach the same conclusions
Bagley does. The dissonance in some of Dwyer’s fuzzy logic becomes
incomprehensible when Bagley repeats almost verbatim the Dwyer
logic as original thought.¹³⁹
The Jailers and the Gilman Aﬃdavit
When Bagley does get speciﬁc with Dwyer’s work, he focuses on a
dispute between a claimed jailer, assistant U.S. Marshal Edwin Gilman,
and U.S. District Attorney Sumner Howard (p. 308). Relying solely on
Dwyer’s secondary work, Bagley tells us that Gilman’s aﬃdavit reported
that Howard at the trial intentionally suppressed Lee testimony that
would have implicated Brigham Young. Bagley, however, does not refer
to Gilman’s aﬃdavit because Dwyer lacks one and, hence, Bagley does
not have it. After telling us about Gilman, Bagley reiterates the suggestion that “the Mormons had corrupted Howard” (p. 309).
It is curious that when Bagley discusses the Gilman affidavit he
relies on a secondary source that never had the aﬃdavit. The aﬃdavit
in full, and Sumner Howard’s response to the aﬃdavit, were published
in the New York Herald (James G. Bennett’s paper) on 12 April 1877.
The day before, the Salt Lake Daily Tribune had published Howard’s response on 11 April.¹⁴⁰
139. Dwyer wrote that “he [Howard] indicated that these involved the risk of incurring
the enmity of the Gentile faction in order to lull the suspicions of the Mormons.” Dwyer,
The Gentile Comes to Utah, 104, emphasis added. Bagley wrote that “he [Howard] claimed
he had provoked Utah’s non-Mormons to lull the suspicions of the Mormons” (p. 308, emphasis added). Neither Dwyer nor Bagley made a lot of sense.
140. “Lee’s Confession. A Guard’s Charges against District Attorney Howard. The Culprit
Deceived. Promised a Full Pardon for a Full Revelation. Was Brigham Blackmailed? Lee
Shot, His Document Garbled; But No Further Arrests,” New York Herald, 12 April 1877,
p. 7. The Gilman charges were also discussed the day before in “Lee Confession. Evidence
Accumulating That It Was Garbled by Law Officers in the Interest of Brigham Young.
Speculating Officials: The Gilman Affidavit and Lee’s Hopes for a Reprieve,” New York
Herald, 11 April 1877, p. 7; “The Attorney General Says There Is No Gilman Statement on
File. Judge Boreman Reappointed to His Old Position. The Attorney General and Lee,” Salt
Lake Daily Tribune, 12 April 1877, in Fielding, Tribune Reports, 290–91.
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In his aﬃdavit, Gilman declared that he was a jailer in Beaver. At
Howard’s request, Lee prepared a confession, and “as read to and by
me, charged Brigham Young with direct complicity in the Mountain
Meadows Massacre, as an accessory before the fact, that Brigham
Young had written letters to Dame and Haight, at Parowan directing
them to see that the emigrants were all put to death.”¹⁴¹
Bagley, however, does not tell us about Howard’s rebuttal to
Gilman’s charge. Howard’s rebuttal seems irrefutable, and indeed, I
am unaware that Gilman ever attempted a refutation of the rebuttal.
Howard says that no Gilman affidavit was ever found at the Justice
Department (the New York Herald reported it had been ﬁled) and that
Gilman disappeared so nobody could interview him. Howard said that
Gilman was never a jailer at Beaver. Howard said that Gilman never
had an opportunity to speak to Lee and thus Gilman would never have
been in a position to hear any purported confession. Howard reported
that “Gilman is a notorious liar; has been impeached here in Court,
and there are not ten men in the Territory acquainted with him who
would take his oath or word.” Further, the “confession of Lee has not
been sold, altered, suppressed or in any other manner put to an improper use.”¹⁴² Because the Gilman aﬀair is Bagley’s chief source for a
“deal,” I ﬁnd it remarkable that he does not even possess a copy of the
Gilman aﬃdavit.
A more accurate account of the relationship between Howard and
the jailers can be seen from an earlier 21 March 1877 article in the New
York Herald that reported that the jailers were upset that Lee refused
to implicate his accomplices. Howard had given up trying to get information “as was expected and as he indirectly promised.”¹⁴³ Nowhere is
there any shred of evidence that Lee told Howard something that was
141. “Lee’s Confession,” New York Herald, 12 April 1877, p. 7.
142. “Attorney General Says There Is No Gilman Statement on File,” 290–91.
143. “John D. Lee: Preparations for His Execution at Beaver City, Utah; Arrival of the
Regular Troops; The Condemned Man Secluded by His Jailors; He Denounces Brigham
Young; Lee’s Wife and Sons Looking for Indian Aid; A Change in the Church; Brigham
Young, Jr. Thinks Lee Will Not Be Executed; Review of the Crime and the Trials,” New
York Herald, 21 March 1877, p. 7.
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not published in these newspapers. Nowhere is Gilman mentioned
in the earlier article. Nowhere do we read any corroboration of the
statements contained in the supposed Gilman aﬃdavit. Justice of the
peace and jailer Benjamin Spear had claimed one month earlier that
Judge Boreman and other fellow oﬃcers were either timid or bribed
by “Brigham Young’s blood stained coin.” Spear claimed obliquely that
John D. Lee had more to say and had so told Spear at one time, but
Spear wouldn’t get speciﬁc about his charges. Spear also complained
that John D. Lee was permitted to cohabit with his wives.¹⁴⁴
U.S. Attorney General Devens asked Howard to come to Washington
to explain the jailers’ charges, speciﬁcally focusing only on a charge that
the jailers were selling a confession for proﬁt. Nowhere in Devens’s letter
does Devens give any credence to Gilman’s or Spears’s vague claims that
Howard suppressed evidence that implicated Brigham Young. Devens
would have mentioned such an incendiary charge had there been any
credibility to it.¹⁴⁵ On 16 April 1877, Howard told Devens that “I will
state here that the allegations of Gilman are cruel wicked and infamous—
without the least grain of truth.”¹⁴⁶ Bagley tells us that Howard went to
Washington to respond to the charges against him, but the oﬃcial correspondence shows that Devens accepted Howard’s explanation and reversed his request to see Howard.¹⁴⁷
To summarize, the oﬃcial correspondence shows years of prosecutorial eﬀort to apprehend massacre perpetrators. This eﬀort overwhelms the meager and faulty story Bagley puts together from the
144. Benjamin A. Spear to Charles Devens, 2 March 1877, Records of the Department of
Justice, Letters Received, “Mar. 1877 to April 1877,” RG 60, box 1019, National Archives. See
Whitney’s brief treatment of the Gilman aﬀair at Whitney, History of Utah, 2:824.
145. Charles Devens to Sumner Howard, 11 April 1877, Records of the Department of
Justice, RG 60, M 701, reel 7, Instruction Book G, National Archives.
146. Sumner Howard to Charles Devens, 16 April 1877, Records of the Department of
Justice, Letters Received, “Mountain Meadows Massacre Letters 1877,” RG 60, box 1019,
National Archives.
147. “Your letter of the 16th received. Upon reading it I think your presence here not
necessary and revoke previous telegram of that day. If upon receiving your report I should
think otherwise, will telegraph to you.” Charles Devens to Sumner Howard, 23 April 1877,
Microﬁlm NND 170 (3015), consisting of documents obtained from RG 60, 123, 205 and
267, order NND 69–170 A, National Archives.
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Gilman aﬀair. To rely upon secondary material for the “deal” theory,
particularly where primary material was published in the national
press, is not good scholarship. Bagley’s lack of knowledge of the ofﬁcial correspondence discussing prosecutorial eﬀort is a signiﬁcant
impediment to his credibility.
What really happened between Howard and the Church? Let me
suggest a plausible explanation for the facts that have led laypersons in
the past to think there was a deal to make Lee a scapegoat. After the
ﬁrst trial failed and Sumner Howard replaced the prior prosecutors,
the Salt Lake Daily Tribune peppered its editorial column with charges
of prosecutorial bungling. The paper charged the prosecutors with
grandstanding against church authorities and failing to adduce speciﬁc evidence against Lee. U.S. District Attorney Howard, not willing
to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors, decided he needed a diﬀerent strategy and slate of witnesses. However, many of the desired witnesses could not be found. Howard met with church oﬃcials to lobby
their support to encourage witnesses to come forward. Howard assured church authorities that he sought only justice and that he had no
evidence against Brigham Young or George A. Smith. Nor did Howard
give up on Brigham Young; both Orson F. Whitney and the New York
Herald reported that Howard oﬀered Lee a full pardon in exchange for
evidence against Brigham Young.¹⁴⁸ Church authorities probably got
the word out to witnesses to encourage them to cooperate.
Few of the witnesses in the first trial testified in the second.
Howard did not call Klingensmith, who had turned state’s evidence in
the previous trial. This indicates to me that Howard did not want to repeat the errors of his predecessors. Howard probably asked the church
to have a nominal presence at the trial. Daniel Wells agreed to testify,
and he did so. Ostensibly, Wells’s testimony was necessary to show that
Lee was not a high church authority. The night before his testimony,
Wells preached a ﬁery sermon in Parowan demanding justice, but not
necessarily against Lee. (I have not seen the text of that sermon.) The
Deseret News also published editorials demanding justice. The jurors
148. Whitney, History of Utah, 2:824; “Lee’s Confession,” 7.
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deliberated. According to the Corry aﬃdavit, the decision was not an
easy one to make. No external force inﬂuenced the jurors, other than
the social diﬃculty of convicting one’s own. But, in the end, Lee was
convicted. Investigations continued against other perpetrators, but they
secreted themselves eﬀectively in the wilds of the desert. No doubt the
other perpetrators had plenty of Mormon friends and family willing to
assist with their evasion.
The continued theory of a deal to oﬀer Lee as a scapegoat lacks
competent, much less compelling, evidence. Speculation is a game
played by Bagley and Brooks, but there ought to be more than that.
General Concerns about the Quality of the Evidence
I conclude with some general concerns of Blood of the Prophets’s
use of the evidence.
Rumors should not trusted. Some of the rumors Blood of the
Prophets repeats are despicable. One good example of the book’s misuse of rumor is its analysis of Jacob Hamblin’s testimony from the second trial. Blood of the Prophets theorizes that Jacob Hamblin’s sixteenyear-old adopted Indian son, Albert, participated in massacre atrocities
by raping two young women and that Jacob later suggested that Lee
committed the rapes (pp. 304–5). The explanation we are offered is
complicated and illogical. Blood of the Prophets says that Hamblin, who
was not at the massacre, transferred responsibility for the atrocity from
Albert, who claimed to be an observer of the massacre while herding
Jacob’s sheep,¹⁴⁹ to Lee himself to “settl[e] old scores” with Lee (p. 305).
In other words, Blood of the Prophets suggests that Hamblin raped two
young victims, and to make things right somehow, or to make somebody pay for the crime, Jacob Hamblin pinned the crime on Lee.
This rape story is fantasy. The massacre is a sad story, but to heap
upon it this salacious story is tabloid sensationalism. Beadle’s book
and the Salt Lake Daily Tribune are responsible for this rumor.¹⁵⁰
149. Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 107–8.
150. “The manner in which Hamlin [sic] recited Lee’s account convinced some who
heard it that another crime was committed before the girls were killed.” Beadle, Western
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Blood of the Prophets should have relied on the transcript of the trial
because there is nothing in the transcript to suggest this story.¹⁵¹
Brooks, who relies upon the transcript, criticized these stories of
rape as “impossible tales” that are “passed on as fact.”¹⁵² Blood of
the Prophets, with no evidence at all, says these tales “cannot be discounted entirely” (p. 151).
Anonymous sources are usually worthless. I have mentioned my
objections to Argus. Blood of the Prophets also spends several pages
with the “Discursive Remarks,” an anonymous manuscript held by
the Utah State Historical Society (p. 220). Bagley attributes the work
to John D. Lee, as if another Lee account can be trusted.
Vignettes should be presented with balance, regardless of which
point of view they support. Bagley reports the account of William
Hawley’s objections to the massacre and how he was chained to
a wagon wheel when he voiced his objections to the massacre plan
(pp. 119–20, 143). It might have helped our understanding of this
story had Bagley not relegated to a footnote (p. 407) the explanation
that Hawley was one of the massacre perpetrators and that his story
Wilds, 516. “The reluctance with which this evidence was drawn out showed there was
something more shocking yet untold.” “Harrowing Details of the Bloody Massacre,” Salt
Lake Daily Tribune, 17 September 1876, in Fielding, Tribune Reports, 220.
151. “A. There was two young ladies brought out. Q. By whom? A. By an Indian chief
at Cedar City, and we asked him what he should do with them, and the Indian killed one
and he killed the other. Q. Tell the story as [Lee] told you? A. That is about it. Q. Where
were those young women brought from, did he say? A. From a thicket of oak brosh [sic],
where they were concealed. It was an Indian chief of Cedar City brought them out. Q. Tell
just what he said about that? A. The Indian shot one and he cut the others throat, is what
he said. Q. Who cut the others throat? A. Mr. Lee. . . . Q. Go over it again; tell us all the
details of the killing. A. Well, he said they were killed—all he supposed. That the Chief
of Cedar City brought out two young ladies. Q. What did he say the chief said to him?
Asked what he should do with them. Q. What else did the chief say? A. The chief said they
didn’t ought to be killed. Q. Why did the chief say to Lee that they should not be killed?
A. Well, he said they was pretty had he wanted to save them. Q. What did Lee tell you that
he replied to the chief? A. According to the orders that he had they was too big and too
old to let live. . . . A. I told you that he said it was a Cedar City Chief that killed one. Q.
Who killed the other. A. He done it, he said. Q. How? A. He threw her down and cut her
throat.” Trial Transcript (1876), 94–96.
152. Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 105–6.
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was written from the headquarters of a schismatic organization opposed to polygamy and Brigham Young.¹⁵³
Bagley tells us how Brigham Young needled General Johnston on
the high plains with a gift of salt leading Johnston to reject it with
outrage when Johnston believed that Brigham Young had implied the
salt was poisoned (by saying that it was not) (p. 196). It would have
been nice had Bagley told us Johnston’s troops covertly accepted the
gift nonetheless.¹⁵⁴
Bagley’s analysis of the provocation evidence displays the kind of
healthy cynicism he should have applied to the rest of his book, but
Bagley is cynical where the evidence abounds. He discounts stories of
provocation by the Fancher train as having been fabricated long after
the fact. We are told that “no two witnesses told the same story” and
that the stories were “usually based on hearsay, multiplied over the
years.” There is “no evidence to determine whether they had a basis in
fact or were popular myths created to justify murder.” They appeared
“years after the events supposedly occurred.” Some of the stories “originated with murderers such as Lee and Higbee” (p. 117). Bagley should
have applied this same analysis to the frightfully slim and speculative
evidence (dreams, anonymous sources, family traditions, folklore)
upon which he relies to indict Brigham Young and George A. Smith.
On the issue of provocation, Bagley tends to agree with Argus’s
claim that the Fancher train was “one of the . . . most respectable and
peaceful that ever crossed the continent.” Press accounts in California
days after the massacre, however, reported fairly detailed Mormon
claims of provocation by the Fancher party,¹⁵⁵ so it is impossible to
say that these accounts were made up long after the fact. In contrast,
Brooks gives the provocation accounts some credit, noting that they
“come to us from many sources.”¹⁵⁶
153. Bishop, Mormonism Unveiled, 379.
154. Furniss, Mormon Conﬂict, 151.
155. “Our Los Angeles Correspondence: Massacre of Emigrants—Execution of
Johnson—Another Murder—State of the Weather—Rain—Snow—Grapes,” Daily Alta
Californian, 12 October 1857, p. 1, col. 2; “Our Los Angeles Correspondence,” Daily Alta
Californian, 27 October 1857; p. 1, col. 2; Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 46, 48–49.
156. Brooks, Mountain Meadows Massacre, 46.
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Breadth of knowledge in the political and social sciences is important
for this subject matter. I have mentioned a lack of breadth in the political and social sciences in that Bagley does not handle well the external
forces brought to bear on the “Mormon question.” In another example
of weakness of breadth, or at least in a deep bow to political correctness, Blood of the Prophets publishes, on an unnumbered page (photos following p. 224), a photograph of three richly adorned Southern
Paiutes, with a caption that says: “This image from the William R.
Palmer Collection identiﬁes these Southern Paiutes as Y-buts, Williams
Brother, and Joe. Such photographs reveal that the Paiutes were not the
degraded subhumans often described in overland trail accounts.” The
caption implies that early accounts of the primitive Southern Paiutes
were bigoted. The photograph was probably staged. Although I have
not been able to identify the photographer (and neither has Bagley), it
appears to be an 1870s photograph by Jack Hillers, one of the West’s famous photographers who made a name for himself on the second John
Wesley Powell expedition. Photographers of the day, and especially
Hillers, would dress destitute desert Indians with Plains Indian clothing.¹⁵⁷ Contrary to the cotton, leather, and deerskin or buﬀalo skin in
the photograph, many accounts indicated that the Southern Paiutes
were desperately poor, wearing only breechcloths in the summer and
adding some rabbit skins for the winter.¹⁵⁸ Powell reported that the
Southern Paiutes were the most primitive Indians he had ever seen.¹⁵⁹
157. “Anthropologists have pointed out that some of Hillers’s pictures were stage-managed
. . . for white consumption. [He] guss[ied] up the poor, drab Paiutes in Plains Indian glamour.” Donald Worster, A River Running West: The Life of John Wesley Powell (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 286–87. See also Bagley’s own newspaper, Brandon Griggs, “Staged
19th Century Photos of Indians Controversial, Compelling,” Salt Lake Tribune, 20 January
2002, sec. D.
158. “The bands of Pah-Utes, in the southern portion of the Territory are extremely
destitute. . . . This is especially the case with those bands south of Cedar city.” Jacob
Forney to A. B. Greenwood, 29 September 1859, 36th Cong., 1st sess., S. Exec. Doc. 2,
serial 1023, p. 734. Other than the Snakes, “many of the men, women, and children are
entirely naked.” Ibid., 733. There is, however, a photograph of Ute Chief Kanosh and some
of his elders dressed in the white man’s garb in the Church Archives and republished in
Cooley, Diary of Brigham Young, 70.
159. J. W. Powell, “An Overland Trip to the Grand Canyon,” Scribner’s Monthly 10
(October 1875): 675.
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Conclusion
The story of the Mountain Meadows Massacre in Blood of the
Prophets fascinates us in a somewhat prurient sense. We read of sensational marital practices of the Mormons, repulsive violence in the
name of religion, and futile resistance to the armed might of a nascent antebellum nation. Bagley describes the tyranny of a domineering leader in an oppressive ecclesiastical society. A group of innocent
men, women, and children is caught in the convergence of forces
between the good of American Christian principles and the evil of
Mormonism.
The story of the massacre cannot be told as Bagley wishes to tell
it. If Bagley wants to implicate Brigham Young, George A. Smith, and
the nineteenth-century Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
itself, we should expect him to weigh and sift what will probably be
voluminous evidence of dubious quality oﬀered against an unpopular
religion. Bagley accepts this dubious evidence as well as raw speculation. He rejects or misses competent evidence. I challenge the right of
any historian to toss competent evidence on the ash heap in favor of
salacious rumor.
But salacious rumor is what we are often served up by Blood of
the Prophets in an agenda-driven account of history. We should approach the work with a healthy dose of cynicism. I, for one, am convinced even more after reading Blood of the Prophets that there is
no competent evidence to show that Brigham Young and George A.
Smith were accessories before or after the fact.

